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Abstract:
The practice of offering payment to individuals in exchange for their
participation in clinical research is widespread and longstanding. Nevertheless,
such payment remains the source of substantial debate, in particular about
whether or the extent to which.offers of payment coerce and/or unduly induce
individuals to participate. Yet, the various laws, regulations, and ethical
guidelines that govern the conduct of human subjects research offer relatively
little in the way of specific guidance regarding what makes a payment offer
ethically acceptable-or not. Moreover, there is a lack of definitional agreement
regarding what the terms coercion and undue inducement mean in the human
subjects research context. It is, therefore, unsurprising that investigators and
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) experience confusion about how to evaluate
offers of payment, and lean toward conservative approaches. These trends are
exemplified by our pilot data regarding the ways in which some IRB members
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and investigators (mis)understand the concepts of coercion and undue
inducement, as well as the ways in which certain research institutions oversee
offers of payment at a local level.
This article systematically examines the legal and ethical dimensions of
offering payment to research participants. It argues that many concerns about
offers of payment to research participants can be attributed to the misguided view
that such offers ought to be treated differently than offers of payment in other
contexts, a form of "research exceptionalism." We show that rejection of
research exceptionalism with respect to payment helps settle open debates about
both how best to define coercion and undue influence, and how to understand the
relation between these concepts and offers of payment. We argue for adoption of
our preferred definitions, ideally by regulatory authorities, and against the
conventional conservatism toward payment of research participants. Instead, we
draw attention to the rarely asked, even radical, question: are research
participants paid enough? We conclude by arguing that we ought to change the
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In the early days of 2016, news broke that six men had been hospitalized-
one of whom was pronounced brain-dead-after a "serious accident" in the
course of a drug trial conducted in France.' The men were all participants in a
Phase I, or first-in-human, trial of BIA 10-2474,2 a novel compound designed to
treat "anxiety and motor disorders associated with Parkinson's disease, and
chronic pain in people with cancer and other conditions."3 Each participant had
been paid C1,900 (about $2,060), "including travel expenses; in return, they
agreed to stay at [the testing] facility in Rennes [France] for 2 weeks, swallow a
drug on 10 consecutive days, undergo extensive medical tests, and provide at
least 40 blood samples."4 The amount of payment was widely reported in the
wake of the tragedy, with the implication that the offer of payment, or the amount
of payment, signaled that the trial itself was ethically questionable.
Clearly, something went terribly wrong in France.' Yet, if we focus on what
was known at the time the offer of payment was made, rather than allowing
retrospective judgments and suspicions about pecuniary incentives to cloud our
ethical evaluations, was it acceptable to offer the research participants E1,900?
And if it was not, why not?
Offers of payment made to research participants6 have been described as
"one of the more contentious ethical problems" facing institutional review boards
(IRBs).' The U.S. federal regulations and the leading international codes of
research ethics require that consent to participation in research be obtained in a
1. Sewell Chan, 6 Hospitalized, One of Them Brain-Dead, After Drug Trial in France, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/world/europe/french-drug-trial-
hospitalization.html [https://perma.cc/H4LQ-BU73].
2. John Brosky & Cormac Sheridan, Six Hospitalized in Bial Clinical Trial in France, BioWORLD,
http://www.bioworld.com/content/six-hospitalized-bial-clinical-trial-france [https://perma.cc/NM6D-
KC2C].
3. Declan Butler & Ewen Callaway, Scientists in the Dark After French Clinical Trial Proves
Fatal, 529 NATURE 263, 263 (2016).
4. Martin Enserink, More Details Emerge on Fateful French Drug Trial, SCIENCE (Jan. 16,
2016), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/0 1/more-details-emerge-fateful-french-drug-trial
[https://perma.cc/6HFB-TTNL].
5. Declan Butler & Ewen Callaway, Researchers Question Design of Fatal French Clinical
Trial, NATURE: NEWS (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/researchers-question-design-of-
fatal-french-clinical-trial-1.19221 [https://perma.cc/J5JG-6JLJ].
6. We prefer and will use the term "research participant" rather than "research subject."
While "subject" is the more traditional of the two terms, over the past several decades, there has
been a shift to using "participant" because many see it as more respectful. There continues,
however, to be debate. See Ali Hall, What's in a Name? Research "Participant" Versus Research
"Subject", PRIM&R (Jan. 6, 2014), http://primr.blogspot.com/2014/01/whats-in-name-research-
participant.html [https://perma.cc/7KA7-865W].
7. Bruce G. Gordon, Joseph Brown, Christopher Kratochvil & Ernest D. Prentice, Paying
Research Subjects, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 154 (Robery J.
Amdur and Elizabeth A. Banker eds., 2002).
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manner that minimizes the possibility of coercion and undue influence (a term
used interchangeably with undue inducement). Offers of payment made to
research participants have been linked to both concepts, and yet the various laws,
regulations, and ethical guidelines that govern the conduct of human subjects
research offer relatively little in the way of specific guidance about what factors
or features render offers of payment ethically acceptable, or not-or even how to
define coercion and undue inducement. Therefore, IRBs-the administrative
bodies "established to protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects
recruited to participate in research activities conducted under the auspices of the
institution with which [the IRB is] affiliated"'-and investigators are left largely
without a compass to determine whether any particular offer of payment is
appropriate.
Given the lack of clear regulatory guidance, one would fully expect the
space inhabited by IRBs and investigators to be characterized by confusion and a
general trend toward conservative approaches to offers of payment-better to be
safe than sorry in the midst of uncertainty. To the extent that IRBs and
investigators are identifying legitimate ethical concerns about payment, such
conservatism is appropriately protective of research participants. On the other
hand, if ethical concerns about payment are overestimated (or simply wrong), the
limits that follow from a conservative approach are not only unnecessary to
protect research participants, but could actually be ethically inappropriate to the
extent that they prevent research participants from receiving offers of payment
that would fairly compensate them for the risks and burdens of their
participation: Unnecessarily conservative approaches to payment might also
hinder trial recruitment,' thereby delaying scientific and medical progress and/or
unethically exposing research participants to risks and burdens that cannot be
justified by their scientific value if studies fail to complete.o Moreover, such
conservative approaches might result in an unfair distribution of the burdens
and/or benefits" of research participation over the broader population, by failing
to attract a more diverse group of participants. All of this is to say that there are
potential practical and ethical costs to the confusion experienced by IRBs and
investigators, and the "better safe than sorry" approach is not necessarily safer at
8. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEw BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. 1
(1993).
9. See generally Jeffrey L. Probstfield & Robert L. Frye, Strategies for Recruitment and
Retention ofParticipants in Clinical Trials, 306 JAMA 1798 (2011); Darlene R. Kitterman, Steven
K. Cheng, David M. Dilts & Eric S. Orwoll, The Prevalence and Economic Impact of Low-
Enrolling Clinical Studies at an Academic Medical Center, 86 ACAD. MED. 1360 (2011).
10. Scott D. Halpern, Jason H.T. Karlawish & Jesse A. Berlin, The Continuing Unethical
Conduct of Underpowered Clinical Trials, 288 JAMA 358, 358 (2002).
11. Joseph M. Unger et al., Patient Income Level and Cancer Clinical Trial Participation: A
Prospective Survey Study, 2 JAMA ONCOLOGY 137, 137 (2016) ("[L]imiting income disparities is








This article systematically examines the legal and ethical dimensions of
offering payment to research participants. It argues that many concerns about
offers of payment in this context are attributable to misguided "research
exceptionalism"-simply put, the idea that research is meaningfully different
from other contexts in which individuals assume risk. As we show, the rejection
of research exceptionalism with respect to payment helps settle open debates
within the research ethics community about both how best to define coercion and
undue inducement and how to understand their relation to offers of payment.
Recognition that research exceptionalism is problematic, coupled with the
adoption of our preferred definitions of coercion and undue inducement, should
help resolve the confusion exhibited by IRBs and investigators with regard to
offers of payment for research participation. Moreover, it should allow IRBs and
investigators-two groups that have traditionally focused on whether offers of
payment are too high-to focus on the more ethically salient question: are
research participants being paid enough? We think the answer to that question is
often "No."
The article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on why payment
is sometimes considered ethically problematic, and reviews the existing literature
on offers of payment made to research participants. Such offers are a pervasive
feature of research involving both "healthy volunteers" and "patient volunteers,"
individuals who have the disease or condition under study. Moreover, offers of
payment span the spectrum of studies from those that pose minimal risk to
participants to those that are far riskier and more burdensome. The relative
frequency with which payment is offered means that investigators who design
payment schedules and the IRBs that review those payment schedules routinely
confront questions about the ethical acceptability of payment.
Part II surveys regulations and guidelines on the ethics of biomedical
research at two levels: national and international. First, we briefly describe the
U.S. federal regulations and relevant guidance documents governing human
subjects research from both the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP)
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Next, we examine international guidelines, which
are highly influential and may be formally (or even legally) applicable,
depending on where research is conducted. Treatment of payment within these
regulations and guidelines is highly uneven: some fail altogether to address offers
of payment, while others address the purpose, amount, mechanism, and timing of
offers of payment, albeit in a fairly high-level way. As a result, IRBs and
investigators bear significant responsibility both for determining what the terms
coercion and undue influence mean in the context of offers of payment and for
correctly identifying and addressing those ethical concerns when they see them.
While we concede that discretion will always be needed to determine whether
67
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coercion and undue inducement are present in particular circumstances, the lack
of clear definitions and guidance can lead to unnecessary confusion and
conservative approaches.
In Part III, we consider a potential explanation for the debate surrounding
offers of payment to research participants: research exceptionalism. Research
exceptionalism is the view that biomedical research is meaningfully different
from other contexts in which individuals assume risk. Although many individuals
implicitly endorse the idea that research is different, we suggest that nine
common justifications for research exceptionalism ultimately fail, at least when it
comes to offers of payment. Though we favor robust regulatory protections for
participants in human subjects research, we maintain that common arguments for
research exceptionalism do not identify characteristics of research that can justify
regulating offers to payment to research participants more heavily than offers of
payment made in other areas.
Part IV explores the considerable academic discussion related to coercion
and undue inducement in the context of research ethics generally and in relation
to payment specifically. No clear consensus has materialized regarding what
these concepts mean, but we review the dominant themes and arguments that
have emerged. We argue for our preferred definitions of coercion and undue
inducement and show that some definitions necessarily fail with the rejection of
research exceptionalism.
To demonstrate how the regulatory underdevelopment and conceptual
confusion play out in practice, Part V reviews selected institutional policies
related to payment of research participants. Such policies, typically promulgated
by IRBs in conjunction with administrators, guide both investigators' design of
and IRBs' deliberations regarding offers of payment to research participants. The
want of substantive direction from either regulatory authorities or international
bodies has unsurprisingly resulted in correspondingly wide variation in
institutional policy.
In Part V, we also present the results of two small pilot surveys we
conducted with a sample of IiRB members, administrators, investigators, and
study coordinators. Our aim was to examine how individuals who are actively
engaged in human subjects research and protection think about offers of payment
generally, and about the concepts of coercion and undue inducement specifically.
While these are preliminary findings, and we call for more research, our data
contribute to the growing empirical literature showing that confusion exists
among IRB members regarding how to define the terms coercion and undue
inducement.12 Our pilot survey is the first to examine how investigators define
12. Emily A. Largent et al., Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: A Survey of Attitudes
About Payments to Research Participants, 34 IRB: ETHICS & HuM. RES. 1 (2012); Robert Klitzman,
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those terms; it is unsurprising but valuable to see that investigators are confused
in much the same way that IRB members are. Moreover, both groups subscribe
to definitions that are consistent with research exceptionalism, and inconsistent
with our preferred approaches.
Finally, Part VI builds on our analysis, definitions, and findings to make
recommendations for policy and practice. We recognize that it may be impossible
for IRBs and investigators to reach consensus amongst themselves on what the
terms coercion and undue inducement mean, given the relative ambiguity of U.S.
federal regulations and international guidelines and the persistent lack of
agreement among bioethicists about the features of ethically acceptabh' offers of
payment. In the short-term, it is desirable that IRB members and investigators
stop assuming that labels-that is, calling an offer "coercive" or "unduly
influential"-alone do sufficient explanatory work when deciding whether a
payment is ethically acceptable. In the long-term, we believe that official
regulatory guidance and educational efforts by enforcement agencies are needed
to clarify these concepts.
Helping the research community speak with greater precision about their
concerns regarding offers of payment by adoption of common definitions will
enable a more concrete separation of ethically acceptable and unacceptable
payment structures, which may have the effect of improving trial recruitment and
promoting fair compensation of research participants, with new attention paid to
the problem of underpayment.
I. BACKGROUND: OFFERS OF PAYMENT IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Human subjects research is research in which human beings ("as opposed to
animals, atoms, or asteroids" 3 ) are the subjects of study. A "human subject" is
defined by the regulations governing most federally-funded human subjects
research as "a living individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting
research obtains (1) data through intervention or interaction with the individual,
or (2) identifiable private information." 4
Clinical research is that "subset of human subjects research which focuses
13. David Wendler, The Ethics of Clinical Research, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa12012/entries/clinical-research/
[https://perma.cc/W7ME-A2H2].
14. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2015). The amended regulations, finalized in January 2017 and
effective in 2018 (assuming no change before then), define a human subject as "a living individual
about whom an investigator . . . conducting research: (i) Obtains information or biospecimens
through intervention or interaction with the individual, and uses, studies, or analyzes the
information or biospecimens; or (ii) Obtains, uses, studies, analyzes, or generates identifiable
private, information or identifiable biospecimens." Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, 82 FED. REG. 7149, 7260 (Jan. 19, 2017). See also 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(6) (2017) ("Human
subject means an individual who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient of the
test article or as a control. A subject may be either a healthy human or a patient.").
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on improving human health and well-being." 5 Clinical research is "designed to
test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge. . . . Research is usually described in a
formal protocol that sets forth an objective and a set of procedures designed to
reach that objective." 6
Central to the distinction between research and care is "the idea that the
purpose of clinical research is fundamentally different from that of clinical
medicine: whereas medical care focuses on providing optimal care to individual
patients, clinical research is primarily concerned with producing generalizable
knowledge for the benefit of future patients," even when individual research
participants may fortuitously accrue benefits themselves.17 Other characteristics
of research include the use of distinctive methodologies-such as randomization,
placebo controls, and blinding-that "sacrifice personalization of care" in favor
of scientific validity and the inclusion of some "procedures that hold no prospect
of medical benefit for the research participant, but which are justified in light of
their scientific value."" Research also presents a distinctive relationship between
the research participant and the investigator, which is best understood in
opposition to the relationship between a patient and her doctor. Franklin Miller
and Howard Brody explain:
[W]hen physicians of integrity practice medicine, physicians' and patients'
interests converge. The patient desires to regain or maintain health to relieve
suffering; the physician is dedicated to providing the medical help that the
patient needs. In clinical research, by contrast, the interests of investigators
and patient volunteers are likely to diverge, even when the investigator acts
with complete integrity.19
15. Wendler, supra note 13. Social behavioral research studies individuals' responses to
internal and external stimuli. While social-behavioral research is not the focus of this paper,
payment is often used in that research as well. Many of the concerns raised herein would also be
relevant in that context. See also 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(c) ("Clinical investigation means any experiment
that involves a test article and one or more human subjects and that either is subject to requirements
for prior submission to the Food and Drug Administration under section 505(i) or 520(g) of the act,
or is not subject to requirements for prior submission to the Food and Drug Administration under
these sections of the act, but the results of which are intended to be submitted later to, or held for
inspection by, the Food and Drug Administration as part of an application for a research or
marketing permit.").
16. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter THE BELMONT REPORT].
17. Emily A. Largent, Steven Joffe & Franklin G. Miller, Can Research and Care Be Ethically
Integrated?, 41 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37, 37 (2011).
18. Id. at 37-38.
19. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic
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Again, this is because the purpose of research is to advance science and
medicine, not necessarily to benefit individual participants. Given these key
differences between research and care, it is unsurpnsing that the two activities
are governed by distinctive normative commitments. 20
The phrase "offer of payment" is an umbrella term used to capture all
instances in which money-either cash or cash equivalent-is provided to
research participants. Although controversy persists surrounding offers of
payment to research participants, the practice is widespread and growing.2 1
A. Why Might Offers of Payment Be Ethically Concerning?
The practice of offering payment to individuals in exchange for their
participation in certain types of clinical studies is generally recognized as an
important-and often essential-tool to reach enrollment targets.22 Despite the
longstanding nature of the practice, whether payment is a "necessary evil" or
legitimate compensation for services rendered is the source of substantial debate.
A minority of commentators contends that altruism should be an individual's sole
motivation for research participation, such that payment beyond reimbursement
of a participant's out-of-pocket costs is ethically inappropriate.2 3 The majority of
academic literature on this topic, however, has focused on establishing those
circumstances under which offers of payment may be ethically acceptable,
addressing concerns related to the amount, mechanism, timing, and context of
20. Emily A. Largent, Steven Joffe & Franklin G. Miller, A Prescription for Ethical Learning,
43 HASTINGS CENTER REP. S28, S28 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, What's the Price of a Research Subject?
Approaches to Payment for Research Participation, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (1999); see
also Christine Grady et al., An Analysis of US. Practices of Paying Research Participants, 26
CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 365, 366 (2005); Christine Grady, Money for Research Participation:
Does It Jeopardize Informed Consent?, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 40, 40 (2001).
22. Leah E. Hutt, Paying Research Subjects: Historical Considerations, 12 HEALTH L. REV. 16,
16 (2003). Offers of payment to research participants are often defended on the pragmatic grounds
that they facilitate timely recruitment of the right numbers and types of participants. See, e.g., Laura
B. Dunn & Nora E. Gordon, Improving Informed Consent and Enhancing Recruitment for Research
by Understanding Economic Behavior, 293 JAMA 609 (2005). While there is a need for more
empirical research to show how increasing incentives affects recruitment for clinical trials
specifically, there is evidence from survey research that larger offers of payment improve
recruitment. See, e.g., Nancy L. Keating et al., Randomized Trial of $20 Versus $50 Incentives to
Increase Physician Survey Responses, 46 MEDICAL CARE 878 (2008); Connie M. Ulrich et al., Does
It Pay to Pay? A Randomized Trial of Prepaid Financial Incentives and Lottery Incentives in
Surveys of Nonphysician Healthcare Professionals, 54 NURSING RES. 178 (2005); Scott D. Halpern
et al., Randomized Trial of $5 Versus $10 Monetary Incentives, Envelope Size, and Candy to
Increase Physician Response Rates to Mailed Questionnaires, 40 MED. CARE 834 (2002); David A.
Asch et al., Conducting Physician Mail Surveys on a Limited Budget: A Randomized Trial
Comparing $2 Bill versus $5 Bill Incentives, 36 MED. CARE 95 (1998).
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payment.2 4
As mentioned above, and as will be discussed at greater length in Part II, the
U.S. federal regulations, as well as the leading international codes of research
ethics, explicitly stipulate that consent to participation in research should be
obtained in a manner that minimizes the possibility of both coercion and undue
inducement.2 5 Informed consent, central to ethical clinical research, serves to
"ensure not only that individuals control whether or not they enroll in clinical
research," but also that "they participate only when doing so is consistent with
their values and interests."2 6 In order to provide adequate informed consent,
prospective research participants must be: (1) informed of the purpose, methods,
risks, benefits, and alternatives to research participation; (2) comprehend this
information and understand its particular relevance to them; and (3) make a
voluntary decision to participate.27
Unfortunately, there is no broad consensus in the research ethics literature as
to what constitutes coercion or undue inducement-a matter we delve into at
length in Parts II and IV. Therefore, we will not define the terms here, instead
reserving that discussion for later. There is, however, general consensus that
coercion and undue inducement render consent invalid, though the mechanism by
which they do so remains open to debate. Many understand both coercion and
undue inducement to compromise voluntariness, 28 whereas others argue that
coercion compromises voluntariness while undue inducement chiefly
compromises comprehension.2 9
24. See generally Carl Elliott & Roberto Abadie, Exploiting a Research Underclass in Phase 1
Clinical Trials, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2316 (2008); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Undue Inducement:
Nonsense on Stilts?, 5 Am. J. BIOETHICS 9 (2006); Ruth W. Grant & Jeremy Sugarman, Ethics in
Human Subjects Research: Do Incentives Matter?, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 717 (2004); Trudo Lemmens
& Carl Elliott, Guinea Pigs on the Payroll: The Ethics of Paying Research Subjects, 7
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 3 (1999). In addition to broad concerns about offers of payment to
research participants, unique ethical concerns also arise with respect to particular sub-populations
of participants, for example, drug users. See, e.g., Craig L. Fry et al., The Ethics of Paying Drug
Users Who Participate in Research: A Review and Practical Recommendations, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 21 (2006).
25. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2015); see also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. (CIOMS),
INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH-RELATED RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 44
(2016), http://www.cioms.ch/ethical-guidelines-2016 [https://perma.cc/AKC2-TXXC] (stating that
the informed consent process requires "ensuring that the person has adequately understood the
material facts and has decided or refused to participate without having been subjected to coercion,
undue influence, or deception.").
26. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701, 2706
(2000).
27. See generally JESSICA W BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 249 (2001).
28. E.g., David Casarett et al., Paying Hypertension Research Subjects: Fair Compensation or
Undue Inducement?, 17 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 651, 651 (2002) ("Undue inducements decrease
voluntariness, an essential component of valid consent.").
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The potential effect of offers of payment on research participants has been
described as either coercive, unduly influential, or both, and therefore potentially
problematic in terms of satisfying the ethical (and legal) requirement for valid
informed consent. Simply put, many think that the offer of money can hold an
overwhelming allure for research participants, the result of which is to render
invalid their consent to research participation. To pick but one example, a writer
discussing the adverse events in the BIA 10-2474 trial described at the outset of
this article stated that "[w]ith many in poverty, there is an inherent coercion in
this type of trial" and concluded that it is "imperative . . . that we ... minimize
the coercion of financial incentives" in clinical research. 30
Because people have highly disparate views on the necessary and sufficient
conditions for coercion and undue inducement, there is great heterogeneity
regarding when offers of payment are thought to be acceptable. To fully
appreciate the controversy engendered by offers of payment, it is necessary to
consider them at a more granular level. Various characteristics of both the
payment itself and the study for which payment is being offered are thought to
have normative importance when determining the ethical acceptability of an offer
of payment. That is what we turn to next.
B. Which Research Participants Receive Offers of Payment?
From an investigator's perspective, research participants are selected
through the development of inclusion and exclusion criteria, as well as through
recruitment strategies.31 Inclusion and exclusion criteria are standards
prospectively set forth in a study protocol that are used to determine whether an
individual is or is not eligible to participate in a particular study.32 For example,
inclusion and exclusion criteria may account for age, pregnancy-status,
comorbidities, or an individual's treatment history.
Although inclusion and exclusion vary widely by study, a basic and
fundamental distinction can be drawn between research participants who are
healthy volunteers-individuals with no known health problems-and those who
are patient volunteers-individuals at risk for or with the condition under study.
Reflections on the Views of IRB Members, 27 BIOETHICS 500, 507 (2013) (arguing that coercion
compromises voluntariness, whereas undue influence compromises comprehension of risks).
30. Judy Stone, Bial's Clinical Trial in France Ends in Disaster What Went Wrong?, FORBES
(Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/judystone/2016/01/16/bials-french-clinicial-trial-ends-
in-disaster-what-went-wrong/#6a59c2f 4 9b2 c [https://perma.cc/A72X-YYCF].
31. Emanuel et al., supra note 26, at 2704 (discussing the ethical importance of fair subject
selection).
32. Whereas inclusion criteria are characteristics that individuals must have in order to
participate, exclusion criteria are characteristics the possession of which disqualifies an individual.
See generally Harriette G.C. Van Spall et al., Eligibility Criteria of Randomized Controlled Trials
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Presently, demand for research participants often outstrips the number of
individuals willing to take part.3 3
From a potential research participant's perspective, diverse factors may
prompt agreement to participate in clinical research.34 For instance, healthy
volunteers may be motivated by a wish to help others, to move science forward,
or to receive financial compensation. 35 Patient volunteers may be motivated by
these factors as well, but they may also wish to receive innovative therapies only
available in the research context in hopes that they will receive direct medical
benefit. A direct benefit to research participants is a benefit that arises from
receiving the intervention being studied, as opposed to other types of so-called
collateral benefits that may be associated with trial participation, such as access
to specialists and more attentive care. 36
There is a common perception "that money is offered only to healthy
subjects in research, and rarely to patient-subjects with the disease or condition
under study." 37 Relatedly, commentators sometimes assume (or argue) that while
it is legitimate to offer payment to healthy volunteers for their participation in
research, one should not offer to pay patient volunteers, at least when they stand
to accrue other benefits from research participation.38 Others, however, have
persuasively argued that there is no inherent reason to treat healthy volunteers
and patient volunteers differently with respect to payment. 39 Data suggest that, in
practice, researchers do in fact nearly always offer payment to healthy research
participants, and also increasingly offer payment to patients who participate in
clinical research, even when the study holds the prospect of direct medical
benefit.40
C. Why Are Offers of Payment Made to Research Participants?
Investigators may be motivated to offer payment to research participants for
a number of reasons, and the perceived ethical acceptability of these reasons
33. Dinora Dominguez et al., Commonly Performed Procedures in Clinical Research: A
Benchmark for Payment, 33 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 860, 860 (2012).
34. See, e.g., Leanne Stunkel & Christine Grady, More Than Money: A Review of the
Literature Examining Healthy Volunteer Motivations, 32 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 342 (2011).
35. E.g., Luis Almeida et al., Why Healthy Subjects Volunteer for Phase I Studies and How
They Perceive Their Participation?, 63 EUR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1085 (2007) (finding financial
reward was the most important motivation).
36. Nancy M.P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 332 (2000).
37. Grady et al., supra note 21, at 366.
38. E.g., Trudo Lemmens & Carl Elliott, Justice for the Professional Guinea Pig, 1 Am. J.
BIOETHICs 51, 52 (2001). But see Dickert & Grady, supra note 21, at 198.
39. Dickert & Grady, supra note 21, at 198.
40. See Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL
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varies greatly.4' Figure 1 shows possible reasons for offering payment that have
been identified by IRBs and regulators, arrayed from least to most
controversial.42 It is important to appreciate that it is not just the dollar value of
payment that is subject to ethical critique, but also the function that the payment
is understood to serve by the investigator and the IRB.43
First, money might be offered to reimburse participants for research-related
expenses, for example, travel to the study site. Such offers may enable
individuals who could not otherwise afford to participate or who would not be
willing to make a financial sacrifice to participate to do so." The practice of
offering money as reimbursement is uncontroversial and widely accepted.4 5
Additionally, money may compensate individuals for time and effort
expended or inconvenience experienced in the course of participating in research,
beyond true out-of-pocket costs. Payment may be used as a recruitment incentive,
too, particularly if the amount offered is high enough to overcome lack of
interest, or-for certain subgroups within the population-lack of awareness or
distrust.4 6 Money also can serve as a token of appreciation; in contrast to an
incentive, which is offered prospectively, and in contrast to compensation, which
aims to match the value of what has been given, a token of appreciation is
generally small and offered only after the decision to participate has already been
made.4 7 While offers of compensation and tokens of appreciation are generally
not controversial, because they aim to make a participant whole, are quite
minimal or are offered in a way that would not influence decisions to participate,
use of money as an incentive garners mixed reactions.48
Finally, money could be viewed as a benefit to research participants in
assessing whether the risks of participation are reasonable in comparison to the
benefits.49 This approach, however, is extremely controversial since it could
41. Id.
42. This figure was developed, in part, using the empirical data presented in Largent, Grady,
Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 12.
43. See, e.g., Office of Human Research Prots., When Does Compensating Subjects Undermine
Informed Consent or Parental Permission?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & Hum. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/informed-consent
rhttps://perma.cc/CUT4-BXXU ("Information submitted to IRBs should indicate and justify
proposed levels and purposes of remuneration, which also should be clearly stated in the
accompanying consent forms.").
44. Emanuel et al., supra note 26, at 2701.
45. Largent et al., supra note 12, at 5.
46. Grady, supra note 40, at 1682.
47. Grant & Sugarman, supra note 24, at 735 n.3 (2004) ("[I]n the research context, providing
a benefit after the decision to participate has been made is a gift or a token of appreciation, not an
incentive properly speaking because the benefit does not serve as a motivator.").
48. Largent et al., supra note 12, at 5.
49. Alan Wertheimer, Is Payment a Benefit?, 27 BIOETHICS 105, 105 (2013).
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allow even very risky research to proceed so long as the "price" was right.5o
Indeed, IRBs are warned not to consider remuneration as a way of offsetting risks
when it comes to approving research."' Nonetheless, this does not preclude
consideration of risks when setting appropriate remuneration amounts, and there
are no restrictions on how prospective research participants might view or
perceive the offer of payment when deciding whether or not to participate.52
Compensation Benefit to offset
Reimbursement Token of Recruitment
for time, r- 01 risks (not to be
for research- for time, appreciation incentive r
effortconsidered by
related expenses (retrospective) (prospective)
inconvenience IRB)
Figure 1. Reasons for Offering Payment to Research Participants, arrayed
from least to most controversial.
D. How Much Payment is Offered to Research Participants?
Published journal articles rarely mention whether payment was offered to
research participants, and almost never mention the amount.53 Additionally, most
research studies do not specify a dollar value for any given procedure in either
the protocol or consent document.54 Yet, some efforts have been made to
quantify what research participants are paid. In 2012, ethicists at the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) Clinical Center reviewed four years of data to estimate
payment amounts for common research procedures.5 They estimated $20 for a
blood sample, $10 for a urine sample, and $30 for a 1-hour questionnaire.5 ' This
is generally consistent with data from a national survey conducted by Elizabeth
Ripley and colleagues, 5 ' as well as with suggested monetary compensation for
50. Id. at 111 (discussing the "jacking-up" argument).
51. Office of Human Research Prots., supra note 43; see also Holly Fernandez Lynch, Human
Research Subjects as Human Research Workers, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 122, 156-
157 (2014) ("Although technically silent on the matter of whether payment to subjects may be
based on risk, the [U.S. federal] regulations' direction to avoid undue inducement is often taken to
mean that risk-based payment is impermissible.").
52. Office of Human Research Prots., supra note 43 ("remuneration to subjects may include
compensation for risks associated with their participation in research and that compensation may be
an acceptable motive for agreeing to participate in research.").
53. Brandon Brown et al., Transparency of Participant Incentives in HIV Research, 3 LANCET
e456 (2016); Robert Klitzman et al., The Reporting of Monetary Compensation in Research
Articles, 2 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON HuM. RES. ETHICS 61, 64 (2007).
54. Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
1681, 1681 (2005); Grady et al., supra note 21, at 369.
55. Dinora Dominguez et al., Commonly Performed Procedures in Clinical Research: A
Benchmark for Payment, 33 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 860, 867 (2012).
56. Id
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routine research procedures outlined by the Boston-based Partners Healthcare
Human Research Protection Program.ss Others have found that the procedure-
related dollar value for MRIs can range from $25 to $120 (mean $58) and that
variation can occur even within the same institution.5 9
While these are valuable benchmarks, they hardly exhaust the spectrum of
offers of payment-particularly as studies vary with respect to complexity,
number of procedures, length, et cetera.60 One study of consent documents for
thirteen HIV cure studies found a range from "no payment to nearly $2,000,"
though neither the median nor mean payment was identified." In 2005, a review
of IRB-approved protocols and consent forms from 467 studies offering payment
to research subjects approved by eleven IRBs across the United States found that
the total amount of compensation offered for a complete study varied from $5 to
$2,000.62 The authors found that nearly two-thirds of studies offered less than
$250, and the median total across all studies was $155.63 Studies with some
prospect of direct medical benefit, studies having at least one invasive procedure,
and studies with a greater number of clinic visits were associated with higher
dollar amounts offered.'
It is not possible to offer a straightforward explanation for the observed
variation in offers of payment. The methods by which investigators determine
how much payment to offer have proven difficult to discern, as there is no clear-
cut correlation between the amount offered and explicit factors, such as
procedures or visits. 6 5 This has led some to speculate that these decisions are
simply "guesstimates."66 That is, investigators pick a lump sum that feels
appropriate to them and/or that is likely to pass muster with their RB. Variation,
then, may be the result, among other factors, of vague guidance regarding the
appropriateness of payment or different understandings of how to value research
participation or of the functions that payment serves. More concretely, variation
Chairpersons, 5 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON HuM. RES. ETHICS 43, 54 (2010).




59. Grady et al., supra note 21, at 369.
60. Our work focused on offers of payment to adults, but for data on offers of payment to
adolescents see Dina L.G. Borzekowski et al., At What Price? The Current State of Subject
Payment in Adolescent Research, 33 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 378 (2003).
61. Gail E. Henderson, The Ethics ofHIV "Cure" Research: What Can We Learn from Consent
Forms?, 31 AIDS RES. & HUM. RETROVIRUSES 56, 60 (2015).
62. Grady et al., supra note 21, at 370.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also The Ethics of Compensation for Healthy Trial Participants, QUORUM REVIEW
IRB (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.quorumreview.com/ethics-compensation-healthy-trial-participants
[https://perma.cc/7KKM-PDJQ].
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can be explained by the constraints established by study budgets and desires to
avoid certain paperwork, tax reporting, or other requirements that are triggered
when payments exceed a certain threshold.6 7
Considered together, these figures suggest that the offer of payment made to
participants in the French experiment discussed at the beginning of this paper is
on the higher end of the spectrum, but certainly not off the charts.68
II. REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES RELATED TO PAYMENT OF RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS
With this background in mind, we now turn to regulations and guidelines
governing human subjects research to describe what they say about coercion and
undue inducement generally and what, if anything, they say about offers of
payment specifically. In short, the answer is not much. The want of meaningful
guidance at both the U.S. and international levels may help to explain the
heterogeneity of offers of payment described in the preceding section, as well as
the conservative approaches to payment we see both anecdotally69 and in many
institutional policies, as described in Part V. In what follows, we outline the
various definitions of coercion and undue inducement offered in these regulations
and guidelines, but we refrain from normative evaluation until Part IV because
the shortcomings of these definitions are most evident when facilitated by the
discussion of research exceptionalism provided in Part III.
A. American Regulations and Guidelines
Federal laws governing human subjects research demonstrate "a societal
commitment to the advancement of scientific knowledge provided that the
advances occur in accord with ethically sound principles and practices."70
Although federal regulations and guidelines call attention to some of the ethical
issues that payment raises, they offer little substantive guidance regarding how
ethically to offer payments to research participants.7 '
67. For example, we know from talking with investigators that some institutions require that
payments in excess of, e.g., $50 be paid by check. In order to satisfy participants' preference for
cash and to avoid the administrative burden and delays of having checks issued, offers of payment
will be kept at or below $50, even if a higher level of payment could be justified.
68. The individuals who experienced severe adverse reactions in the 2006 TeGenero trial were
paid approximately $3,500 to participate. Meredith Wadman, London's Disastrous Drug Trial Has
Serious Side Effects for Research, 440 NATURE 388, 388 (2006).
69. See, e.g., Eleanor Singer & Robert Bossarte, Incentives for Survey Participation: When Are
They Coercive?, 31 AM. J. PREV. MED. 411, 413 (2006) (relating how IRBs are "increasingly
saying" that $40 to $100 incentives for survey response have been deemed "coercive").
70. Jonathan Moreno et al., Updating Protections for Human Subjects Involved in Research,
280 JAMA 1951, 1951 (1998).
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1. The Belmont Report
The BELMONT REPORT,72 promulgated by the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, is one of
the foundational documents of bioethics, setting forth ethical principles and
guidelines to govern the conduct of human subjects research. The report itself is
not legally binding, but we begin with it here because its principles underlie the
current U.S. federal regulations.
The BELMONT REPORT explains that "[r]espect for persons requires that
subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the opportunity to choose
what shall or shall not happen to them. This opportunity is provided when
adequate standards for informed consent are satisfied." 74 As described above,
informed consent is understood to ensure that individuals control whether they
participate in research and that they participate only when participation is
consistent with their values, preferences, and interests. The Belmont Report states
that:
[a]n agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only
if voluntarily given. This element of informed consent requires
conditions free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs when
an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to
another in order to obtain compliance. Undue influence, by contrast,
occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or
improper reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance. Also,
inducements that would ordinarily be acceptable may become undue
influence if the subject is especially vulnerable.7 1
The authors of the BELMONT REPORT clearly understood coercion and undue
inducement as distinct concepts, but it is implied that both affect the
voluntariness of consent. It is worth noting that the authors resisted drawing a
bright line between that which is a mere inducement (i.e., ethically acceptable)
72. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16. Congress established the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("National
Commission") in 1974 amidst "public outrage and congressional uncertainty over the Tuskegee
syphilis experiments and other questionable uses of humans in research." Tom L. Beauchamp, The
Belmont Report, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 149 (Ezekiel J.
Emanuel et al. eds., 2008).
73. David A. Hyman, Institutional Review Boards: Is this the Least Worse We Can Do?, 101
Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 750 n.3 (2007) ("Although there were classified regulations governing human
experimentation issued by the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Energy in the 1940s
and 1950s, and the National Institutes of Health issued regulations on research involving human
subjects in 1966, most scholars date the beginning of comprehensive feral regulation of human
subjects research to 1974, when the regulation that ultimately gave rise to the Common Rule was
issued.").
74. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
79
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and that which is undue (i.e., ethically unacceptable), instead emphasizing the
contextual nature of undue inducements. The BELMONT REPORT does not
directly address payment.
2. The Common Rule
The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects is codified in the
separate, but identical, regulations of eighteen Federal departments and agencies,
and accordingly referred to as the "Common Rule."7 6 The Common Rule is "a
uniform regulatory floor for human subjects research . . . which generally
requires informed consent, independent ethical review, and the minimization of
avoidable risks."n Common Rule standards apply to all research funded by these
eighteen departments and agencies, regardless of where that research occurs. The
FDA has not adopted the Common Rule, but applies essentially the same
standards to all clinical investigations of products regulated by FDA involving
human subjects, regardless of funding source.
The Common Rule requires IRBs to ensure that investigators will secure
research participants' informed consent." It states that "[a]n investigator shall
seek [informed] consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective
subject . . . sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and
that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence."so The Common
Rule does not define either term, nor does it directly address offers of payment.
However, to the extent such offers trigger concerns about either coercion or
undue influence, they fall within the IRB's regulatory purview to address and
responsibility to resolve.
The fact that the Common Rule (and its FDA equivalent) cover almost all
clinical research conducted in the U.S., and a broad swath of research conducted
abroad,"' underscores the important role of IRBs in reviewing offers of payment
to research participants and the importance of understanding the many open
questions IRB members-and investigators-face when assessing the
acceptability of said offers.
76. Moral Science: Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES (PCSBI) 2 (2011),
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%2OScience%20June%202012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLX9-K4TN]. All participating departments and agencies include language
identical to that of the HHS codification at 45 C.F.R. § 46, subpart A in their chapters of the Code
of Federal Regulations. We will, therefore, refer to the HHS regulations.
77. Id.
78. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2015).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2015).
80. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2015) (emphasis added).
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3. OHRP Frequently Asked Questions About Human Research
Created in 2000,82 OHRP is the office within HHS that "provides
clarification and guidance, develops educational programs and materials,
maintains regulatory oversight, and provides advice on ethical and regulatory
issues in biomedical and behavioral research"83 funded or conducted by the
Department. OHRP's website addresses a number of Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) about human subjects research, including questions regarding offers of
payment. Because the FAQs "provide guidance that represents OHRP's current
thinking on these topics",84 they offer helpful insight, though they "should
[merely] be viewed as recommendations, unless specific regulatory requirements
are cited.""
On the one hand, OHRP acknowledges that "[p]aying research subjects in
exchange for their participation is a common and, in general, acceptable
practice."86 On the other, it cautions that despite, or perhaps because of, the "lack
of clear-cut standards on the boundaries of inappropriate and appropriate forms
of influence, investigators and IRBs must be vigilant about minimizing the
possibility of coercion and undue influence."" Although more research is
needed, one might infer that a call to be "vigilant" from an important oversight
body-one with a variety of enforcement mechanisms available to it, including
institution-wide suspension of research-coupled with limited substantive
guidance on how best to offer payment to research participants could lead to
extreme caution and support expansive understandings of coercion and undue
inducement. A review of OHRP enforcement letters in complaint-initiated
investigations uncovered only a handful of instances in which the agency found
"unethical inducement through large offers of money,"8 but the mere threat of
regulatory action in this space is often enough to shape behavior." This is
82. Before OHRP was formed, the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) was
housed at the NIH. OPRR was dissolved in 2000 and responsibility was transferred to the office of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
83. Office of Human Research Prots., About OHRP, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about [https://perma.cc/4BQU-TZ3Q]; see also Scott Burris & Jen Welsh,
Regulatory Paradox: A Review of Enforcement Letters Issued by the Office for Human Research
Protection, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 647 (2007).
84. Office of Human Research Prots., Frequently Asked Questions about Human Research,
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/faq [https://perma.cc/Q45Y-
DYPW].
85. Id
86. Office of Human Research Protections, supra note 43.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Burris & Welsh, supra note 83, at 664.
89. Consider, for example, that FDA inspection activity has a deterrent effect on industry non-
compliance, though only a small portion of clinical trial sites are inspected. Mary K. Olson, Agency
Rulemaking, Political Influence, Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 573,
599 (1999). Office of the Inspector General, Challenges to FDA's Ability to Monitor and Inspect
Foreign Clinical Trials, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERvs. (June 2010),
81
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supported by our pilot data, described below, as well as anecdotal experience
with IRB administrative staff and members.
4. Definitions
In one FAQ, the following question is posed: "What does it mean to
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence?"90 In response, OHRP
provides the following definitions of coercion and undue inducement that
largely-though incompletely-align with those found in the Belmont Report, as
well as examples:
Coercion occurs when an overt or implicit threat of harm is intentionally
presented by one person to another in order to obtain compliance. For
example, an investigator might tell a prospective subject that he or she will
lose access to needed health services if he or she does not participate in the
research.9 '
Undue influence, by contrast, often occurs through an offer of an excessive
or inappropriate reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance. For
example, an investigator might promise psychology students extra credit if
they participate in the research. If that is the only way a student can earn
extra credit, then the investigator is unduly influencing possible subjects. If,
however, she offers comparable non-research alternatives for earning extra
credit, the possibility of undue influence is minimized.92
With respect to undue inducement, the FAQ observes that "it is often
difficult for IRBs to draw a bright line delimiting undue influence" because it is
highly contextual.93
5. Substantive Recommendations Regarding Payment
OHRP acknowledges that "difficult questions must be addressed by the
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-08-00510.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PJ-UCD7] (FDA inspected
only 1.9% of domestic clinical trial sites).
90. Office of Human Research Prots., What Does It Mean to Minimize the Possibility of
Coercion or Undue Influence?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/Informed-Consent/index.html
£https://perma.cc/TJ8P-HXQU].
91. Elsewhere within the FAQs, "overt coercion" is defined as "e.g., threatening loss of
services or access to programs to which the potential subjects are otherwise entitled." Office of
Human Research Prots., Can Non-Financial Enrollment Incentives Constitute Undue Influence?,
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-
policy/guidance/faq/Informed-Consent/index.html lhttps://perma.cc/TJ8P-HXQU] (emphasis
added).
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IRB." 94 The FAQ "When does compensating subjects undermine informed
consent or parental permission?" advises the following:
"Remuneration for participation in research should be just and fair.
However, the specifics of each protocol will influence how those
determinations are made. Both researchers and IRBs need to be familiar
with the study population and the context of the research in order to make
reasonable judgments about how compensation might affect
participation."9 5
* "IRBs should be cautious that payments are not so high that they
create an 'undue influence' or offer undue inducement that could
compromise a prospective subject's examination and evaluation of the
risks or affect the voluntariness of his or her choices." 96
* "IRBs and investigators should ensure that the consent process
includes a detailed account of the terms of payment, including a
description of the conditions under which a subject would receive partial
or no payment (e.g., what will happen if he or she withdraws part way
through the research or the investigator removes a subject from the study
for medical or noncompliance reasons)." 97
* "[I]n studies of considerable duration or that involve multiple
interactions or interventions, OHRP recommends that payment be
prorated for the time of participation in the study rather than delayed until
study completion, because the latter could unduly influence a subject's
decision to exercise his or her right to withdraw at any time."98
It noteworthy that this FAQ links offers of payment only to undue
inducement and not to coercion, suggesting that offers of payment cannot be
coercive. We take precisely this position below, although it is one that is disputed
in the research ethics community. The FAQ does not, however, explicitly say that
offers of payment cannot be coercive, which would be an even clearer - and we
suggest more desirable - statement on the matter. Additionally, the FAQ
suggests that undue inducement affects the voluntariness element of consent.
6. FDA Information Sheet
FDA also offers an Information Sheet on Payment to Research Subjects,99
94. Id.
95. Office of Human Research Prots., supra note 43.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
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which like the OHRP FAQs is a non-binding guidance document, but also the
most extensive guidance IRBs have when seeking to implement and adhere to
FDA regulations. The Information Sheet acknowledges that "[i]t is not
uncommon for subjects to be paid for their participation in research, especially in
the early phases of investigational drug, biologic or device development."' 0
Among other things, the Information Sheet advises IRBs to "review both the
amount of payment and the proposed method and timing of disbursement to
assure that neither are coercive or present undue influence."' Specific
guidelines for evaluating offers of payment include:
* "All information concerning payment, including the amount and
schedule of payment(s), should be set forth in the informed consent
document."'0 2
* "Any credit for payment should accrue as the study progresses and
not be contingent upon the subject completing the entire study. Unless it
creates undue inconvenience or a coercive practice, payment to subjects
who withdraw from the study may be made at the time they would have
completed the study (or completed a phase of the study) had they not
withdrawn."'O3
* "While the entire payment should not be contingent upon completion
of the entire study, payment of a small proportion as an incentive for
completion of the study is acceptable to FDA, providing that such
incentive is not coercive."'04
* "The IRB should determine that the amount paid as a bonus for
completion is reasonable and not so large as to unduly induce subjects to
stay in the study when they would otherwise have withdrawn."'o
Unlike the OHRP FAQ, the FDA guidance clearly links offers of payment to
both coercion and undue inducement. As noted above and discussed further
below, we disagree with this approach. Therefore, it is useful to note that OHRP
and FDA could be seen as coming out on different sides of this debate.
B. International Guidelines
While the Common Rule and its FDA equivalent cover most clinical
Z5RC].
100. Id.
101. Id (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id (emphasis added).
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research conducted in the United States,'06 investigators' and IIRBs' deliberations
regarding what constitutes an acceptable offer of payment may also be influenced
by a number of prominent ethical guidelines relating to the conduct of biomedical
research. Some countries have adopted these as regulatory requirements, while in
other places, they are merely advisory. Investigators may voluntarily import them
into protocols or be mandated to do so under certain conditions.
Many of these international guidelines were written in the aftermath of
ethics scandals or in response to the perceived shortcomings of prior
documents.' 07 As a result, there is a tendency to emphasize some ethical
requirements while overlooking others.' This context may help explain why the
guidelines provide little specific guidance regarding offers of payment.
1. Nuremberg Code
The Nuremberg Code was formulated by American judges "sitting in
judgment of Nazi doctors accused of conducting murderous and torturous human
experiments in the concentration camps." 109 Although the Code says nothing
about payment specifically, it does address coercion. The first principle is: "The
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." The Code goes
on to specify that "[tlhis means that the person involved should . . . be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of . . .
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision.""o Coercion is not defined, however.
2. Declaration ofHelsinki
The World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki is "a statement of
ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects . . . addressed
primarily to physicians.""' Like other guidelines and regulations discussed in
this article, the Declaration places an emphasis on the importance of voluntary
consent to participation in research. Additionally, the 2013 revision of
Declaration states that "[t]he protocol should include information regarding ...
incentives for subjects" and be submitted for consideration and approval to an
106. PCSBI, supra note 76, at 31, 39-40.
107. Emanuel et al., supra note 26, at 2701.
108. Id. at 2701-02 (offering examples of selective emphases and oversights).
109. Evelyne Shuster, Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1436 (1997).
110. 10 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 181-182 (1949),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Militaryaw/pdf/NTwar-criminals Vol-X.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GDC-
Z7P4] (emphasis added).
111. WORLD MED. ASS'N (WMA), DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2013).
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IRB. 112 The Declaration does not define coercion or undue inducement, nor does
it raise these concerns in relation to offers of payment.1 3
3. Good Clinical Practice Guidelines
The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) Good Clinical
Practice (GCP) guidelines are "an international ethical and scientific quality
standard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that involve
the participation of human subjects."ll4 They provide "a unified standard for the
European Union, Japan, and the United States to facilitate the mutual acceptance
of clinical data by the regulatory authorities in those jurisdictions."'15
According to the ICH GCP E6 guidelines, the RB should "review both the
amount and method of payment to subjects to assure that neither presents
problems of coercion or undue influence on the trial subjects. Payments to a
subject should be prorated and not wholly contingent on completion of the trial
by the subject."ll 6 Additionally, the IRB "should ensure that information
regarding payment to subjects, including the methods, amounts, and schedule of
payment to trial subjects, is set forth in the written informed consent form and
any other written information to be provided to subjects. The way payment will
be prorated should be specified.""' Unlike the OHRP FAQs but like the FDA
information sheet on payment, the GCP guidelines suggest that payments can be
both coercive and unduly influential. Neither term is defined.
4. CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Compared with the preceding guidelines, the recently revised 2016
International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans,
prepared by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS) in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), offer a
more definitive answer to questions about offers of payment to research
participants."' Guideline 13 (Reimbursement and compensation for research
participants) states:
112. Id.
113. Id. (stating only that the research ethics committee must be free of "any other undue
influence").
114. Guidance for Industry E6 Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guidance, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. (April 1996), http://www.fdagov/downloads/Dmgs/. . . /Guidances/ucm073122.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2B9A-9VTY].
115. ICH Guidance Documents, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidanceslnformationS
heetsandNotices/ucm219488.htm [https://perma.cc/2TYA-WR96].
116. Guidance for Industry E6, supra note 114, at 11 (emphasis added).
117. Id
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Research participants should be reasonably reimbursed for costs directly
incurred during the research, such as travel costs, and compensated
reasonably for their inconvenience and time spent. Compensation can be
monetary or non-monetary. The latter might include free health services
unrelated to the research, medical insurance, educational materials, or other
benefits.
Compensation must not be so large as to induce potential participants to
consent to participate in the research against their better judgment
("undue inducement"). A local research ethics committee must
approve reimbursement and compensation for research participants." 9
Helpfully distinguishing between reimbursement and other types, of
payment, the Commentary on Guideline 13 explains further that participants
should not have to pay to participate in research in the form of bearing direct
expenses like transportation costs themselves, and calls for participants to be
reasonably reimbursed for such expenses. In addition, "participants must be
appropriately compensated for the time spent and other inconveniences resulting
from study participation" - although explicitly not for risk that participants agree
to undertake - and payment amounts "should be calculated using the minimum
hourly wage" in the trial location. The commentary goes on to clarify that the
"obligation to reasonably reimburse and compensate" participants arises even
when participants otherwise stand to benefit from their participation.12 0
Recognizing the relevance of a study's risk level, the commentary notes that
"[e]specially when the research poses low risks, providing compensation should
not raise concerns about undue inducement." This is notable among all the
guidance discussed so far, as it is the only statement of a reason not to worry
about payment in some contexts. However, the commentary does state that "as
the risks of research procedures having no potential individual benefit for
participants increase, so does the concern that compensation may constitute an
undue inducement. Monetary or in-kind compensation for research participants
must not be so large as to persuade them to volunteer against their better
judgment or deeply held beliefs ('undue inducement')."'2 1
The commentary acknowledges the contextual nature of undue inducement
in the sense that individuals may view compensation differently depending on
their personal situation. Thus, the responsibilities laid on research ethics
committees are substantial:
Research ethics comiittees must evaluate monetary and other forms of
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the particular culture and population in order to determine whether the
average participant expected to enrol [sic] in the study is likely to
participate in the research against his or her better judgment because of
the compensation offered. The appropriateness of compensation is likely
better judged by local research ethics committees than by international
ones. Consultation with the local community may help to ascertain this
even in the case of research conducted in the researcher's own
community. 122
In total, CIOMS offers the most explicit guidance regarding offers of
payment to research participants - providing additional guidance regarding
persons who are incapable of giving informed consent themselves, the timing of
payment in relationship to early withdrawal, and the need for empirical study of
financial incentives themselves. Nonetheless, it still leaves a considerable amount
of discretion to the IRB to determine what constitutes an acceptable offer of
payment. Emphasis is placed on the possibility that offers of payment will be
unduly influential, rather than coercive.
In this section, we have reviewed payment-related guidance at both the U.S.
and international levels. This is important because discussions of payment-related
regulations are often focused on the Common Rule, and it serves as a useful
reference to assemble these documents together.
As we have indicated throughout, these documents may or may not be
legally applicable depending on where research is conducted, but they are
nevertheless highly influential. They consistently emphasize the importance of
research participants' informed consent and point out that coercion and undue
influence can vitiate consent. Yet, treatment of payment within these regulations
and guidelines is highly uneven and at times contradictory. For example, whereas
one might reasonably infer that OHRP does not worry about offers of payment
being coercive, FDA clearly links payment to coercion, as does the ICH GCP E6
guideline.
As a result, IRB members and investigators bear significant responsibility
both for determining what the terms coercion and undue influence mean, how (if
at all) they apply to offers of payment, and for correctly identifying and
addressing those ethical concerns when they arise.
III. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST RESEARCH EXCEPTIONALISM WITH REGARD TO
PAYMENT
As Part II established, regulations and guidelines regarding offers of
payment to research participants generally establish as the default that such offers
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or both, and so might undermine the validity of research participants' informed
consent. Given this default, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the context of
human subjects research, offers of payment are often viewed with a high index of
suspicion, despite being quite common. We attribute much of the concern about
offers of payment to research participants to the problem of research
exceptionalism.
Many people have been taught-or intuitively believe-that research is
meaningfully different than other areas of life in which we accept burdens,
discomforts, and risks. They are, therefore, much more concerned about threats
to the validity of consent posed by payment in the research context than they are
in other contexts, such as employment.' 23 As a result, research in general, and
offers of payment made to research participants in particular, are more stringently
regulated and scrutinized than many other activities that involve both payment
and the imposition of seemingly similar-or even greater-levels of risk.' 24
While people often worry that offers of payment made to research participants
may be too high, we do not hear comparable concerns voiced about payment to
individuals engaged in risky work, such as police offers, firefighters, pilots, and
even commercial truck drivers.'2 5 Indeed, many would argue that these
individuals are not paid enough. Why the discrepancy?
Of course, the fact of this divergent thinking is not in and of itself proof that
the current level of oversight and scrutiny applied to clinical research payments
is, as a normative matter, too great. Instead, one might argue that (1) offers of
payment made elsewhere are insufficiently scrutinized, and that we should not
level-down in the research context, or (2) there are sound ethical reasons why
offers of payment made to research participants, in particular, should be treated
differently.1 26 Position (2) is consistent with a view of justified research
exceptionalism.
Here, we will identify nine arguments made in favor of research
exceptionalism, some with more force and frequency than others, and show that
they all ultimately fail to justify the more stringent regulation of offers of
payment made to research participants. There may, we concede, be reasons to
think that research is meaningfully different from other contexts and that some
enhanced protections are appropriate for research participants in general.
However, in our view, these reasons do not relate to payment.
123. Largent et al., supra note 12.
124. James Wilson & David Hunter, Research Exceptionalism, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 45, 45
(2010) (offering a "qualified defense" of research exceptionalism).
125. It may be that people in these jobs deserve higher payments for a variety of reasons-such
as shift-work and specialized training or skill-but risk is among them.
126. Cf Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 45.
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A. History ofEthical Abuses
Probably the foremost reason given in favor of special regulation of human
subjects research is the history of egregious ethical abuses.1 27 Many of the ethical
guidelines and regulations governing human subjects research have grown out of
particular scandals.1 28 The scandal-and-reform dynamic has led to a progressive
ratcheting up of research participant protections.1 29
We don't dispute the seamy history. Yet, we agree with James Wilson and
David Hunter that
[t]hese cases do provide prima facie evidence that unregulated research
can be abused. However, they fall short of demonstrating the case for
research exceptionalism. . . . First, they do not show that these risks are
specific to research: Abuses can and have occurred in many other areas
of human existence. Second, they do not show that regulation will
prevent these abuses. To justify research exceptionalism, we need to
demonstrate that there are risks that are either specific to research or
are more likely in research.'30
Additionally, and most importantly for our purposes, these foundational and
transformational abuses have nothing directly to do with offers of payment.
Instead, they were related to concerns with outright torture (e.g., Nazi
experimentation 3 1), deception (e.g., the Tuskegee syphilis studies 132), researcher
conflicts of interest (e.g., the Jesse Gelsinger gene therapy case' 33), and the like.
Even in high-profile cases where the offer of payment was subsequently
subject to scrutiny, ethical fault laid with the way the trials were conducted,
127. See generally Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1354 (1966) (detailing examples of unethical and questionably ethical studies).
128. Emanuel et al., supra note 26, at 2701.
129. Other ethics regulations also follow this scandal-reform dynamic. See, e.g., G. CALVIN
MACKENZIE & MICHAEL HAFKEN, SCANDAL PROOF: Do ETHICS LAWS MAKE GOVERNMENT
ETHICAL? 55-86 (2002) (discussing cumulative efforts to regulate the ethical behavior of executive
branch officials).
130. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 49 (emphasis added).
131. George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, The Nuremberg Code, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK
OF RESEARCH ETHICS 136-37, (Ezekiel J. Emanuelet al. eds., 2008) ("The victims who did not die
in the course of such experiments surely wished that they had.").
132. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1992).
133. Gelsinger, who was 18 years old, participated in a gene therapy trial at the University of
Pennsylvania. He experienced a severe immune reaction to the vector (i.e., the gene's delivery
vehicle) and became the first person to die because of participation in gene-therapy research. The
major questions after his death involved informed consent and conflict of interest disclosure. Sheryl
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rather than with the offer of payment itself (e.g., the TeGenero TGN1412 trial 3 4).
Critically, the tragic outcomes attributable to ethical violations in these cases
would have been no more acceptable if payment had not been offered to research
participants.13 The mere fact that money was offered to research participants
should not, therefore, bias our evaluation of whether the research was conducted
ethically. Scandal does not make payment in the research context exceptional.
B. Risk ofHarm to Research Participants
Another common argument given in support of research exceptionalism is
that research exposes participants to the risk of harm. Research-related risks can
be analyzed as a function of two distinct components: (1) the likelihood that
harm will occur, and (2) should it occur, the magnitude of the harm.13 6
Admittedly, participation in research can be associated with significant risks:
individuals have been seriously injured and even died as a result of their
participation." Yet, "research participation . . . is not usually as risky as the
general public perceives it to be.""' Additionally, many quotidian activities
expose individuals to at least some risk of harm. The pervasive nature of risk is
acknowledged in the Common Rule, which defines minimal risk research in
terms of risks "ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." 39 Even granting that
some research studies are riskier than the risks we ordinarily assume in daily life,
"[i]t is not clear that research per se is specifically risky." 40 Therefore, the risk of
harm does not itself justify research exceptionalism.
The argument from risk of harm also clearly fails when applied more
narrowly to offers of payment to research participants. As explained in detail in
our other scholarship, we think that participation in research is most
appropriately analogized to labor; relevant comparators include police work and
military service, jobs that are important to the community but also offer personal
134. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Franklin G. Miller, Money and Distorted Ethical
Judgments about Research: Ethical Assessment of the TeGenero TGN1412 Trial, 7 AM. J.
BIOETHIcs 76 (2007); Wadman, supra note 68.
135. Emanuel & Miller, supra note 134, at 78.
136. Annette Rid et al., Evaluating the Risks of Clinical Research, 304 JAMA 1472, 1473
(2010).
137. See, e.g., Julian Savulescu, Harm, Ethics Committees and the Gene Therapy Death, 27 J.
MED. ETHICS 148 (2001) (discussing the death of Jesse Gelsinger); Robert Steinbrook, Protecting
Research Subjects-The Crisis at Johns Hopkins, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 716 (2002) (discussing the
death of 24-year-old Ellen Roche in an asthma study).
138. Lynch, supra note 51, at 133; see generally Chris J.D. Zarafonetis et al., Clinically
Significant Adverse Effects in a Phase I Testing Program, 24 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 127 (1978).
139. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2015).
140. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 49.
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benefit.141 There is little normative debate about whether it is acceptable to offer
payment, or higher payment, to people who accept risky jobs. To the contrary,
outside the research context, the main concern seems to be that people will be
unfairly compensated-that is, exploited-if they are paid too little. For example,
"[t]he life-and-death nature of the job [policing] is used to push for extremely
generous .. . pay packages."l42
[ln theory, the market should dictate (and some laws do) that risky
work be better compensated, a phenomenon called the compensating
wage differential. Further, even when risky jobs are held by those with
few other options for less risky work that is comparably compensated,
the law does not require that their payment be restricted on that basis.14 3
Thus, the fact that research participation exposes people to risk of harm
cannot stand alone as an argument against offering payment-even generous
payment-research participants.
C. Uncertainty ofRisk in Research
The next possibility we consider is that it is not the risk of harm per se but
some characteristic of that risk that justifies research exceptionalism. For
example, it might be that the risk in research is uniquely amorphous. Research is,
after all, intended to answer open questions regarding interventions about which
knowledge is limited; therefore, "[u]ncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of
research."l4 4 At the outset, it may be impossible to know with certainty the scope
of potential or likely harms-as well as the potential benefits-faced by research
participants.'4 5
Yet, there is less uncertainty about research risks than it may appear,
particularly as investigational products proceed through their development.
Before a study of a new FDA-regulated product can proceed to human trials, for
example, FDA must be convinced that there is adequate data from laboratory and
animal testing to support the claim that the drug is safe enough to give to
research participants;14 6 IRB approval will be required as well, as a further check
141. See Lynch, supra note 51, at 141.
142. David Feige, The Myth of the Hero Cop, SLATE (MAY 25, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andpolitics/politics/2015/05/the myth_oftheherocop poli
ceunions have spread a dangerous message about.html [https://perma.cc/ZD2B-YZGA].
143. Lynch, supra note 51, at 157 (internal citations omitted).
144. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 51.
145. Id.
146. The FDA's Dmg Review Pmcess: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucml43534.htm [https://perma.ce/WCP7-
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on whether the risks are appropriately minimized and reasonable. Moreover, as
clinical research progresses through the different phases, there will be a
substantial accretion of data; therefore, uncertainty should dissipate over time.
While granting that there is some degree of uncertainty in clinical research,
it is necessary to point out that there is uncertainty about risks in many
contexts-consider, for example, exposure to environmental pollutants, or even
approved drug products. When risk is uncertain, regulation can be an appropriate
response, but the key observation to our present analysis is that it is not clear why
research should be regulated more stringently than other areas similarly
characterized by uncertainty.
Looking to offers of payment specifically, even if uncertainty about research
risks was somehow unique, it is unclear why that uncertainty would be a reason
to pay research participants less. Above, we discussed the compensating wage
differential for risky work, and here, we would reiterate that it may be
appropriate to pay research participants more when risks are uncertain, precisely
as compensation for that uncertainty. The argument from uncertainty of risks
does not necessarily or even obviously lead to the conclusion that offers of
payment to research participants should be constrained, and so further
justificatory work is needed to defend research exceptionalism with respect to
payment.
D. Risk Assumed for the Benefit of Others
A fourth possible argument in favor of research exceptionalism is that the
purpose of research is to generate socially valuable knowledge. As discussed
above, research-related risks and burdens are justified not in light of the potential
to benefit the individual research participant but in light of their potential to
benefit future patients. In research, unlike in other activities, the argument goes,
there is tension between the individual good and the public good because risk is
assumed for the benefit of others, and so additional scrutiny is needed.
This apparent distinction also proves illusory, however. First, at least some
individuals may, in fact, benefit from participation in research, for example from
a successful experimental intervention or from free medical care that is delivered
in the course of the study. 147 Even when individuals are motivated to participate
in clinical research solely by altruism, they may benefit by contributing to
research when they share the ends for which the research is undertaken.1 4 8
[https://permacc/GF4A-LBJM].
147. Nancy M.P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 332, 333 (2000). While payments made to research participants are, technically, a
collateral benefit, they are treated separately in research ethics and policy. Id.
148. Cf Lynn A. Jansen, The Problem with Optimism in Clinical Trials, 28 IRB: ETHICS & HUM.
RES. 13, 18 (2006).
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Second, assumption of risk in other areas of life cannot accurately be
characterized as entirely self-interested; it is often also for the benefit of society.
Again, consider police officers. While it is clearly in their personal interests to
work in order to collect a paycheck, their jobs only exist because others
experience a clear benefit and, therefore, create demand for such jobs.
Additionally, consider the job of commercial fishing - a risky occupation that
exists to satisfy consumer demand for fish; the social benefit is mere satisfaction
of consumers' taste for fish.
If society is willing to pay people to engage in risky but socially beneficial
activities - even when the benefits are arguably frivolous, as in the fishing
example - "then consistency seems to require that they also be allowed to receive
payments for participating in socially beneficial research involving serious
risk."'4 9 Thus, the argument that risk is assumed for the benefit of others in
clinical research also fails to support the exceptional scrutiny given to research
payments.
E. The Optional Nature ofMedical Progress
A fifth possible argument-a variant of that just considered-is that medical
progress is optional, whereas other risky but socially beneficial endeavors are
not. Hans Jonas has, for instance, admonished us "not [to] forget that progress [in
the conquest of disease] is an optional goal."'50
Relatedly, and arguing specifically against payment of research participants,
Paul McNeil concedes that some dangerous work, such as fire fighting, is
necessary, but he denies that "experiments are ... necessary to society in the way
in which some dangerous work may be.""' He argues that the risks of research
cannot be justified in the same way as the risks of necessary work. McNeil's
distinction, fails, however. As we have explained elsewhere:
If dangerous work such as fire fighting is necessary . . . why is
dangerous work such as research participation - which may also save
lives and meet basic human needs - any less so? There seems to be no
reason to distinguish between different types of potentially preventable
deaths when people have voluntarily put themselves at risk in the
149. Terrence F. Ackerman, An Ethical Framework for the Practice of Paying Research
Subjects, 11 IRB: ETMcs & HUM. RES. 1, 1 (1989).
150. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, DAEDALUS
219, 245 (1969). Jonas goes on to say, "Let us also remember that a slower progress in the conquest
of disease would not threaten society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore that their
particular be not yet conquered, but that society would indeed be threatened by the erosion of those
moral values whose loss, possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would
make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having." Id.
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service of a greater good. 152
On our view, medical progress is not optional. Some kinds of research are
morally obligatory to conduct, assuming they can be conducted ethically. One
might respond that a fire fighter who rushes into a burning building to save
someone offers an immediate benefit, whereas participation in research saves
lives over a much longer time-scale. Admittedly, that will often be the case. Yet,
as a matter of intergenerational equity, it is unclear why we should favor lives
currently in existence (or presently in jeopardy) over lives not yet in existence (or
not presently in jeopardy). Our moral impulse to save identifiable lives should
not blind us to the imperative to save statistical lives when possible.'5 3
Yet, even if we were to assume arguendo that medical progress is optional,
one must allow that some risky jobs that yield social benefits but are indisputably
optional, like commercial fishing, exist without controversy. If we allow payment
for those jobs-and we do-then the optional nature of social benefit, if true,
could not justify research exceptionalism with respect to payment.
F. Difficulty Securing Research Participants'Informed Consent
Another argument for research exceptionalism stems from the now
substantial evidence that many who participate in research suffer from the
therapeutic misconception-that is, they confuse the goals of clinical research
(social benefit) with the goals of clinical care (individual benefit)-and, at least
some individuals may be unaware that they are participating in research at all.' 54
More generally, some people may assume the risks of research participation
despite a failure to fully comprehend them. Some commentators use this fact to
argue that "we should not allow people to make significant life choices without
fully understanding the potential consequences for their lives."' 5
Yet, as Wilson and Hunter astutely point out, "[W]hile research protocols
may be difficult to understand, they are no more difficult and often considerably
152. Lynch, supra note 51, at 157.
153. In our personal morality, we believe that we do have greater obligations to identified
individuals than to individuals unknown to us. Personal morality cannot, however, be neatly
transposed on the public sphere. Cf Emily A. Largent & Steven D. Pearson, Which Orphans Will
Find a Home? The Rule of Rescue in Resource Allocation for Rare Diseases, 42 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 27, 30 (2012).
154. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research:
Frequency and Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 4-5 (2004) ("A total of 61.8%
(n=139) of participants were judged to have a TM."); Charles W. Lidz et al., Therapeutic
Misconception and the Appreciation of Risks in Clinical Trials, 58 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1689, 1693
(2004) ("23.9% (n = 37) of subjects reported no risks or disadvantages of any sort from
participating in these trials."); Steven Joffe et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical
Trials: A Cross-Sectional Survey, 358 LANCET 1772, 1774 (2001) ("A quarter of respondents did
not agree that the main purpose of clinical trials is to benefit future patients. Many did not realise
that the treatment being research was not proven to be the best for their cancer.").
155. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 50.
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less difficult to understand than many official documents such as the fine print on
mortgage documentation."i" Of course, the risks are not clearly analogous (e.g.,
physical v. financial), but as the housing crisis made clear, signing a mortgage
without full comprehension can have devastating repercussions. Moreover, the
conduct of research-like mortgages-is heavily regulated, and there are calls to
make informational documents easier to understand in both contexts.' 57
Nevertheless, the fact that it is difficult to secure truly informed consent from
research participants does not, on its own, justify research exceptionalism. True
understanding is a challenge in many contexts.
In fact, difficulty in securing research participants' genuinely informed
consent may be a stronger argument in favor of payment than against it. Offers of
payment may help research participants distinguish clinical research from clinical
care, since offering payment to research participants "might send the message
that they were participating in these trials for the sake of science and should be
compensated for it, which would not occur if they were . . . expected to benefit
from it."' Certainly, our doctors do not pay us in the course of clinical care;
instead, we pay them. Accordingly, any offer of payment might help flag for
research participants the distinct risks and burdens of research, presumably with
higher payments offering even stronger signals. This is an empirical claim that
deserves further examination.
G. Commodification
One potential justification for research exceptionalism with respect to
payment, in particular, is that offering to pay people who participate is wrongful
commodification. It has been said, for example, that "[p]ayment to patients to
serve as research subjects is an ethically unacceptable commodification of
research practice."159 Individuals concerned with commodification feel that it is
improper to offer money for certain goods or services, even if the validity of the
consent is not in doubt. This may be a threshold concern as to whether payment
156. Id.
157. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) Know Before You Owe mortgage
disclosure rule is "designed to help consumers ... avoid costly surprises at the closing table."
Know Before You Owe - Mortgages, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/know-before-you-owe/ [https://perma.cc/AH2J-97KG]. Similarly,
the NPRM aims to address concerns that "[i]nformed-consent documents grow ever longer and
consistently exceed the eighth-grade reading level, with wide variation in participants'
comprehension." Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Reform of Clinical Research Regulations, Finally, 373 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2296, 2297 (2015).
158. William Glannon, Phase I Oncology Trials: Why the Therapeutic Misconception Will Not
Go Away, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 252, 254 (2008) ("[T]his option at best would ameliorate but not
resolve the problem of misperception about research."); see also Dickert & Grady, supra note 39, at
198.
159. Ruth Macklin, The Paradoxical Case of Payment as Benefit to Research Subjects, 11 TRB:
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can be offered at all-and not just the amount of payment.
Commodification concerns do animate certain laws and policies outside the
research context. For example, a central provision of the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA), § 301(a), bans the buying and selling of human
organs.160 The legislative history of NOTA clearly shows that Congress felt that
buying and selling of organs was contrary to society's moral values. 6 ' One might
question-as many have-whether prohibitions against organ sales are
appropriate on these grounds.'6 2 Yet, even if one accepts that commodification
concerns are relevant in some contexts, services offered by research participants
are not the same as selling the constituent parts of one's body. As we have
suggested throughout this section, participation in research is most appropriately
analogized to essential (albeit unskilled) labor.' 63 In the context of unskilled
labor-and skilled labor as well-we generally permit people to sell their bodily
services,'6 even when sale of those services exposes them to risk of bodily harm.
It should be "no more worrisome to commodify a person's labor as a research
subject than to commodify a person's labor in other contexts, which happens all
the time."l65
H. Crowding Out Altruism
As mentioned above, a minority of commentators believes that altruism
should be the sole motivation for research participation.'6 6 For them, this may be
a threshold concern as to whether payment can be offered at all for research
participation. Most commentators, however, have focused on the conditions
under which offers of payment can be ethical, suggesting that research
participation does not have to be exclusively or even primarily altruistically
motivated.
Yet, even some who accept a role for offers of payment continue to
emphasize the importance of preserving altruistic motivation. Lynn Jansen
observes, "Those who seek to justify clinical research often point to the
possibility that participants . . . have altruistic motives for participating."' 67 The
160. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012).
161. Emily A. Largent, NOTA: Not A Good Act for Tissues to Follow, 19 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 179 (2016) (analyzing prohibitions against the sale of human organs and tissues).
162. See id.
163. Lynch, supra note 51, at 137.
164. Obvious exceptions would be surrogacy and sex work. While it is beyond the scope of the
present article to defend this proposition, we are of the opinion that it should generally be
permissible to sell the bodily services of surrogacy and sex. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum,
"Whether from Reason or Prejudice ": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 693
(1998).
165. Lynch, supra note 51, at 159.
166. Tod Chambers, Participation as Commodity, Participation as Gift, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 48,
48 (2001).
167. Lynn A. Jansen, The Ethics of Altruism in Clinical Research, 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
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argument goes that if research participants have genuinely altruistic motives,
"then it is easier to justify imposing costs and sacrifices on them in the course of
a trial" than if they do not.168 That is, altruism plays an ethically significant role
in justifying the imposition of risk on research participants. Another argument for
research exceptionalism regarding payment, then, is that offers of payment must
be closely scrutinized to avoid the perverse consequence of diluting prospective
participants' intrinsic motivation to enroll in research.16 9
In practice, and as mentioned above, research participants-even those who
are paid-report experiencing a variety of motivations, including altruism.170
This is comparable to studies of police officers that have found individuals enter
policing for both altruistic and practical reasons; they value the opportunity to
help others but also the attractive job benefits." These findings are both
unsurprising and untroubling; if individuals are capable of satisfying a role's
requirements, why should their motivations matter? Moreover, given that a
variety of motivations can simultaneously coexist within a single individual,
there is no clear argument for why altruistic motivation should be valued more
highly than financial motivation in research, or than it is (or should be) in other
contexts.
Two possible practical implications of crowding out altruistic motivations
among research participants in favor of financial motivations are more troubling,
and could potentially justify greater scrutiny of offers of payment in the research
context than elsewhere. If offering payment dilutes altruistic motivation, this
might (1) reduce the overall pool of prospective research participants, i.e., some
altruists may not participate at all if payment is offered because they find the
offer repugnant, and/or (2) selectively appeal to individuals who are somehow
less desirable as research participants due to their motivation by payment. 172
While a number of experimental studies have examined the effects of financial
incentives on altruistic motivations in other contexts, particularly blood donation,
and generally found results consistent with the crowing out hypothesis,1 7 ' data is
needed about research participation in particular. We grant that these concerns
may be valid in some research contexts; however, they cannot justify restrictive
26, 26 (2009).
168. Id. at 30.
169. Cf RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
(1971).
170. See generally Leanne Stunkel & Christine Grady, More Than Money: A Review of the
Literature Examining Healthy Volunteer Motivations, 32 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 342 (2011).
171. Anthony J. Raganella & Michael D. White, Race, Gender and Motivation for Becoming a
Police Officer: Implications for Building a Representative Police Department, 21 J. CRIM. JUST.
501, 509 (2004).
172. Cf Simone A. Glynn et al., Attitudes Toward Blood Donation Incentives in the United
States: Implications for Donor Recruitment, 43 TRANSFUSION 7 (2003).
173. Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Do All Material Incentives for Pro-Social Activities
Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations, 31 J. ECON.
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approaches to payment in all instances. Rather, a more tailored approach is
appropriate, focused on those situations in which payment might have damaging
instrumental effects, and also considering whether those effects might be avoided
through mechanisms other than limiting payment.
I. Importance ofPublic Trust
The final argument we consider in favor of research exceptionalism has
nothing to do with protecting research participants themselves, but rather with
protecting the research enterprise of which they are a part. Public trust is
"essential to secure funding and institutional support for research and to recruit
human subjects."174 Therefore, the argument goes, research exceptionalism is
justified if it promotes and preserves the public trust. Wertheimer observed,
Whereas society accepts with a relative yawn the fact that people incur
job related injuries or deaths as coal miners, fishermen, and off-shore oil
service workers, society seems to react with great intensity to research
related injuries and deaths, as evidenced by the public concern with the
Jesse Gelsinger case."'
As our replies to prior arguments suggest, we believe the public is mistaken
to react more intensely to harms attributable to research participation than to
harms attributable to traditional work. Yet, even if that more intense response is
mistaken, "the public trust argument maintains that public beliefs are a fact that
must be accommodated."1 76
In response, we first note that there is little evidence that "members of the
public are both generally aware of the existence of [IRBs] and find the notion
reassuring."17 7 In other words, they may simply be unaware of the ways in which
they are protected from research risks, such that these protections cannot possibly
contribute to trust building. More specifically, it is only speculative that research
exceptionalism with respect to payment specifically promotes public trust. To the
contrary, rigorously restricting offers of payment to research participants-
indeed, "protecting" them from offers of payment-could erode public trust by
suggesting that research is more dangerous than it really is, and that participation
is something to be avoided. If individuals nonetheless choose to participate,
restricting payment could also cause research participants to feel they have been
treated unfairly as a result of inadequate compensation.
Beyond these considerations, we believe it would be a mistake to
174. David B. Resnik, Public Trust as a Policy Goal for Research with Human Subjects, 10 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 15, 16 (2010); see also Emily A. Largent, What's Trust Got to Do with It? Trust and
the Importance ofthe Research-Care Distinction, 15 AM. J. BIOETHIcs 22 (2015).
175. Wertheimer, supra note 49, at 116.
176. Id.
177. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 51.
99
39
Largent and Fernandez Lynch: Paying Research Participants: Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
accommodate erroneous beliefs that research is dramatically different from other
potentially risky/uncertain endeavors, and instead favor attempts at education that
build the right kinds of trust. Therefore, public trust-while doubtlessly
important to the research enterprise-is not an acceptable argument for research
exceptionalism, particularly with regard to payment.
We have considered nine arguments sometimes made in favor of research
exceptionalism with respect to payment-that is, in favor of the view that offers
of payment to research participants need to be regulated more stringently than
offers of payment made to individuals in other contexts where they also assume
risks for the benefit of others. For the reasons outlined above, we maintain that
each of these arguments fails. Significantly, we do not claim that these arguments
have failed to identify characteristics of research that might merit regulatory
attention; indeed, we favor robust regulatory protections for human subjects
research, including IRB review. Rather, we claim that these nine arguments fail
to identify factors that justify regulating offers of payment to research
participants more heavily than offers of payment made in other areas.
IV. FROM CONFUSION TO CLARITY: DEFINING COERCION AND UNDUE
INDUCEMENT
As we have discussed in the preceding sections, despite a general consensus
that coercion and undue inducement are to be avoided, there is a lack of clear
regulatory guidance about what constitutes an acceptable offer of payment and
disagreement about when offers of payment to research participants violate
ethical norms. In this section, we will look at the considerable debate within the
research ethics community about how best to define coercion and undue
inducement. For both terms, we will highlight areas of consensus, briefly review
the range of definitions offered within the literature, and offer our preferred
definitions.
A. Coercion
As discussed above, there is a general ethical requirement that prospective
participants give their voluntary consent to participate in research."' The main
worry about coercion is that it affects the voluntariness of consent, and the most
prominent definitions from the bioethics literature relate to voluntariness. Here,
we will consider three commonly used definitions and also address a divisive
question: can offers ever be coercive?
178. Of course, there may be exceptions, such as in emergency research. See, e.g., Emily A.
Largent et al., Is Emergency Research without Informed Consent Justified? The Consent Substitute
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1. Threatening to Make One Worse Off
Recall that the influential BELMONT REPORT states that coercion "occurs
when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to another
in order to obtain compliance."' It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that broad
consensus exists that coercion includes the use of a threat of harm to compel
another to do something against his or her will."so Christine Grady, for example,
has stated, "By definition, coercion is understood to involve a threat of physical,
psychological, or social harm in order to compel an individual to do something,
such as participate in research."' Given the consistent references to harm, it is
generally understood that the person coercing is threatening to make the person
coerced worse off than he would be at his status quo baseline.
2. Threatening to Violate Rights
Alan Wertheimer' 82 and Franklin Miller offer a view of coercion that is
similar-but not identical-to that of the BELMONT REPORT."' On their rights-
violating view of coercion:
A coerces B to do X in a way that invalidates B's consent only if (1) A
proposes or threatens to violate B's rights or not fulfill an obligation to
B if B chooses not do X and (2) B has no reasonable alternative but to
accept A's proposal. Both conditions are necessary.' 8 4
Wertheimer and Miller state that "the main point is that A's proposal is
coercive only if A's 'declared unilateral plan'-[that is,] what A proposes to do if
B does not do X-would violate B's rights."' A classic example would be when
a mugger pulls a knife on someone and says: "Your money or your life." The
mugger is threatening to kill his victim, which would violate the victim's right
179. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 16.
180. E.g., RUTH FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
235-73 (1986); Steven D. Pearson et al., Medicare's Requirement for Research Participation as a
Condition of Coverage: Is it Ethical?, 296 JAMA 988, 989 (2006) ("Coercion occurs when a threat
of some harm compels a person to act in a manner that he or she would not otherwise choose. An
example is that of a kidnapper demanding ransom. The kidnapped victim's family may be coerced
into giving up money to avoid the threatened harm to their loved one.") (internal citations omitted).
181. Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
1681, 1683 (2005).
182. Wertheimer's book COERCION (1987) "sets the current standard and starting point for
continued scholarship" regarding coercion. Scott Anderson, Coercion, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/sum2015/entries/coercion [https://perma.cc/W8VK-UZLJ].
183. Largent, Grady, Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 505.
184. Alan Wertheimer & Franklin G. Miller, Payment for Research Participation: A Coercive
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not to be wantonly harmed by others, if the victim does not acquiesce to
surrender his property. Thus, the victim is coerced to hand over his wallet.
Wertheimer and Miller concede that "[t]here is often little difference
between the worse-off and the rights-violating accounts."'8 6 After all, both views
of coercion will reach the same conclusion in the case of the mugger-what the
mugger has done is coercive.
However, when the two differ, the rights-violating approach is more
accurate, because it allows us to handle (1) cases in which A has a right
to make B worse off than B's status quo, and also (2) cases in which A
has an obligation to render B better off than B's status quo."'
To illustrate (1), a prosecutor does not coerce defendants into pleading
guilty to a crime in exchange for a relatively lenient sentence when he
proposes to take them to trial if they do not plead guilty, even though
both options-pleading guilty and going to trial-are worse than B's
status quo. Why? Because the prosecutor's declared unilateral plan to
take the defendants to trial does not violate their rights relative to that
option, the prosecutor is actually making an offer of leniency rather than
a threat of severity. . . . The defendants' guilty pleas are voluntary.
To illustrate (2), if a physician (A) has an obligation to provide a patient
(B) with medical services free of charge, say, because A is employed by
the national health service, then A actually does coerce B into paying a
fee if A proposes not to provide such services unless B pays. And this is
so even though A does not propose to make B worse off than at present
if B declines.188
We emphasize that in the example for (2), Wertheimer and Miller say A
does not propose to make B worse off than B is at present. In other words, B is
presently untreated and would continue to be untreated if B refuses to capitulate
to A's demand, so B's status quo is unchanged and B is, at least in a sense, not
made any worse off. However, A has an obligation to help B achieve something
superior to the status quo at present, which is why we find coercion under the
rights-violating view when we may not under the worse-off view. Note that there
may be disputes about how to identify the appropriate status quo, however,
because under an alternative approach, one might suggest that A is indeed
threatening to make B worse off by failing to achieve the status quo to which B is
entitled, which is to be treated by A.
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focus on under the rights-violating view can be the source of reasonable debate.
However, it is unnecessary to resolve the matter here because we argue
momentarily that offers of payment cannot be coercive. Thus, in the payment
context, it is unnecessary to strictly distinguish between the worse-off and rights-
violation definitions of coercion, since neither will be present.
That said, we favor the rights-violating account because of its broader
explanatory power. In other words, simply asking if the threat would cause harm
inappropriately identifies coercion in scenarios in which harm is justifiable (e.g.,
when an investigator threatens to remove a subject from a potentially beneficial
clinical trial for failure to comply with the study procedures), and might fail to
identify coercion when harm is arguably not present, but there is an obligation to
make one better off. Importantly, neither the worse-off view nor the rights-
violating view of coercion falls prey to research exceptionalism, since they both
reflect common views of coercion applied outside of the context of research as
well.
3. No Reasonable Alternative
The notion of coercion as existing only when threats of adverse
consequences (harm or rights violation) override the exercise of genuinely free
choice has been characterized as "cramped" by some commentators.' 89 Thus,
another proposed definition of coercion is that an individual is coerced when she
has no reasonable alternative but to accept another's proposal.'"
In contrast to the two prior definitions, this definition does not require a
threat at all. Proponents of this view classify having no reasonable alternative as
a sufficient condition of coercion, not merely a necessary one.' 9' Importantly, due
to its expansive scope, this approach might result in a substantial portion of
research being deemed coercive, since research participation may be a patient
volunteer's best available alternative for therapeutic improvement or a healthy
volunteer's best available alternative to make a comparable amount of money in
a given period of time. Both types of participants may feel that they have no
reasonable alternative, even though individuals always have the option not to
participate in research as a regulatory matter.
Importantly, if one rejects research exceptionalism, the no-reasonable-
alternative view is clearly wrong. Consider these familiar examples from outside
the research context: first, a woman is diagnosed with breast cancer, and her
oncologist tells her that she is unlikely to survive more than a year without
surgery. We would not say that the oncologist has coerced the woman by offering
189. Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: Conscripting Human Research
Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 350 (2010).
190. Joan McGregor, "Undue Inducement" as Coercive Offers, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24, 25
(2005) (emphasis added).
191. Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 184, at 391.
103
43
Largent and Fernandez Lynch: Paying Research Participants: Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
surgery, and it would be nonsensical to claim that the woman cannot give valid
consent to the surgical intervention because she has "no choice" but to have it.
Second, turning to an instance in which payment changes hands, it is unlikely
anyone would say an individual had been coerced to take an unpleasant, risky
(but perfectly legal) job if that was his best or even only option to earn sufficient
funds to cover his bills. In common parlance, we may suggest that both of these
individuals were "forced" in some way to make an unpleasant decision, but we
would not maintain that there had been any ethical violation. If we do not think
that morally problematic coercion occurs in these circumstances, it would be
unjustifiable research exceptionalism to argue that it occurs when research
participants believe-in the absence of any threat-that they have no reasonable
alternative but to participate in research due to an offer of payment.
4. Coercive Offers?
A notable fissure in the literature relates to whether genuine offers, rather
than threats, can ever be coercive.' 92 One of the most visible advocates of the
view that offers can be coercive is Ruth Macklin.'9 3 In a 1989 article, she noted
that the "reason for holding that it is ethically inappropriate to pay patients to be
research subjects is that [offers of payment are] likely to be coercive."' 94 Joan
McGregor more explicitly links the concept of coercive offers to the no-
reasonable-alternative view just discussed. She suggests that coercive offers are
"offers because they propose to make the person 'better off' relative to his or her
baseline . . . but they are coercive since, because of the recipient's lack of
options, the proposal is likely to present the only eligible choice."' 95 Others have
accepted that offers may be coercive on the condition that the offerer is
responsible for the offeree's bad circumstances.1 96
Many, however, have reached a contrary conclusion and assert that genuine
offers (as opposed to veiled threats) cannot be coercive.' 97 While threats reduce
192. Obviously, a threat may be veiled such that it appears to be an offer (e.g., "I will refrain
from shooting you if you give me your money."). This would not be a genuine offer.
193. Ruth Macklin, 'Due'and 'Undue'Inducements: On Paying Money to Research Subjects, 3
IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (1981). Macklin demurred from saying more about this, writing,
"Space does not permit a discussion here of the distinction between undue inducement and coercive
offers." Id. at 3 n.7.
194. Ruth Macklin, The Paradoxical Case ofPayment as Benefit to Research Subjects, 11 IRB:
ETHICS & HuM. RES. 1, 3 (1989).
195. McGregor, supra note 190 (arguing that "undue inducements might be referred to as
'coercive offers'); see also Joan McGregor, Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market,
14 PHIL. RES. ARCHIVES 23 (1988); Joan L. McGregor, Free Markets, Bargaining Power and the
Rules ofExchange, 5 PUB. AFF. QUARTERLY 353 (1991).
196. Martin Wilkinson & Andrew Moore, Inducement in Research, 11 BIOETHICS 373, 378
(1997).
197. Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 184, at 390; see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note
180, at 235-73; Alan Wertheimer & Franklin G. Miller, There are (STILL) No Coercive Offers, 40
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the choices available to an individual, genuine offers expand the individual's
choice set and, therefore, by definition, do not coerce.1 98 Wertheimer and Miller
are emphatic that the "claim that the offer of financial payments can actually
constitute a coercive offer in a manner that undermines informed consent is both
false and incoherent, because genuine offers cannot coerce."l99 If one thinks that
coercion requires a threat (whether of harm or of rights violations), as we do,
offers of payment to research participants cannot be coercive.
For emphasis, our view is that coercion is not a valid or relevant concern
when evaluating offers of payment, although that is not to say that subjects may
not be coerced to participate in other ways. This conclusion does not definitively
resolve the question of whether offers of payment in the research context are
ethically permissible, however, since they may, in some circumstances, cause
undue inducement.
B. Undue Inducement
Although there is also a lack of consensus about how to define undue
inducement, there are several points of general agreement. First, if an inducement
is undue, it could "prompt subjects to lie, deceive, or conceal information that, if
known, would disqualify them as participants in a research project." 2" This not
only threatens to harm research participants-for example, by exposing them to
risks that the exclusion criteria were designed to shield them from-but also
jeopardizes the scientific integrity of the research.
A second area of agreement is that determining the existence of an undue
inducement is highly contextual. For example, Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady
state, "[L]ocal traditions and economic conditions will influence when financial
payments may constitute undue inducements."201 Wertheimer and Miller suggest
that an individual's situation determines whether there is undue inducement; they
emphasize that the "distinction between an unproblematic . . . inducement and an
undue inducement is not a feature of the inducement itself. It is a function of the
relation between the inducement and the subject's response to it."202 Ruth Grant
and Jeremy Sugarman have written that "[u]nder certain conditions, incentives
are implicated in problems of manipulation in the form of undue influence."203
198. Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 184, at 390.
199. Id. at 389.
200. Macklin, supra note 194, at 2; see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. 3 (1993) (warning that undue inducements "may prompt subjects to
lie or conceal information that, if known, would disqualify them from enrolling-or continuing-as
participants in a research project"). But see Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue
Inducement, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 100, 103-104 (2004) (stating that it is unclear whether lying is
a general problem).
201. Emanuel, Wendler & Grady, supra note 26, at 2708.
202. Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 184, at 391.
203. Grant & Sugarman, supra note 24, at 732 (emphasis added). For Grant and Sugarman,
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Finally, Ruth Macklin explored the question of how large a payment constitutes
undue inducement and found it "impossible to arrive at a single, objective
criterion serving to mark off due from undue monetary inducements to
participate in research." 20
Taking these areas of consensus as our starting point, we will consider three
commonly used definitions of undue inducement and also review the empirical
evidence regarding the actual existence of undue inducement in research.
1. Excessive Reward
According to the BELMONT REPORT, "undue influence... occurs through an
offer of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other
overture in order to obtain compliance."205 On this view, the defining feature of
an undue inducement is an offer so disproportionate to what the person is asked
to do that it alone appears as evidence of nefarious intent. Of course, what
constitutes a disproportionate offer may be subjective.
2. Excessive Reward Producing Bad Judgment Entailing Risk ofHarm
Ezekiel Emanuel offers a four-part definition of undue inducements, of
which a reward's excessiveness is only one feature:
First, they entail an offer of a welcomed good, a positive incentive. The
induced person is getting something he or she deems desirable. Second,
the incentive, by some metric, appears excessive or irresistible. While
there is no physical force or external psychological pressure, there is
considerable internal attraction because of the quantity or type of the
incentive. Third, the incentive does not just make the person do
something they are not otherwise induced to do. The incentive must
produce bad judgments. Finally, the bad judgments must in turn
engender ethically, legally, or prudentially undesirable activities. The
activities are undesirable because they contravene the person's interests
and thereby harm them. While bad judgment is necessary, alone it is
insufficient to constitute undue inducement. Undue inducement requires
the action entail a substantial risk of serious harm .. . That is, there must
be a risk of a serious adverse effect for the person. Absent potentially
incentives become problematic when conjoined with "the following factors, singly or in
combination with one another. Where the subject is in a dependency relationship with the
researcher, where the risks are particularly high, where the research is degrading, where the
participant will only consent if the incentive is relatively large because the participant's aversion to
the study is strong, and where the aversion is a principled one-when these conditions are present,
the use of incentives is highly questionable." Id.
204. Macklin, supra note 194, at 2.
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serious adverse consequences of the bad judgment there is no undue
inducement.20 6
Emanuel stresses that all four elements are necessary for an undue
inducement to exist.207 The first condition, that the thing offered be a positive
incentive, immediately distinguishes undue inducement from our preferred view
of coercion, which requires a threat. The second condition requires-like the
excessive-reward view-that the incentive is relatively large in light of what is
being asked. Condition three distinguishes undue inducements from mere
inducements, which is a critical distinction since mere inducements are not
morally problematic (e.g., paying employees a salary so they show up to work,
which they would not be inclined to do for, free). By contrast, an undue
inducement is a genuine offer that "distorts people's reasoning abilities to such a
degree that they undertake something that exposes them to unreasonable risks,
the kind of risks they would not do were they more sober and reasoning clearly,
or to forsake deeply held value."20 8 The fourth condition requires that engaging in
the activity be unreasonably against a person's interests. The irresistible nature of
the inducement coupled with the cognitive distortion results in acceptance of
unreasonable risks.
Unlike the excessive-reward view, which speaks solely to the size and nature
of the offer, the Emanuel account of undue inducement has the advantage of
speaking to how the offer affects the target (i.e., the potential research
participant). Emanuel writes that "[i]nducements prompt ethical concern when
they distort people's judgment, encouraging them to engage in activities that
contravene their interests because they are harmful."2 09 Thus, his account is
superior to the excessive-reward view because it clearly articulates the widely
held concern that an undue inducement creates a cognitive distortion that iinpacts
the validity of consent to enroll.2 10 It also provides additional criteria that more
comprehensively articulate what is wrong about undue inducement.
On our view, as on Emanuel's, if an offer of payment, even an extremely
large one, simply motivates people to enroll in research when they otherwise
would not-and does not distort their perception of the risks or lead them to lie-
then it is a mere inducement and not an undue one.
Given that inducement is a common element of human life, it seems
difficult to see what would be uniquely worrisome about inducement in
206. Emanuel, supra note 200, at 101.
207. Emanuel, supra note 24, at 9.
208. Id.
209. Emanuel, supra note 200, at 100.
210. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK
ch. 3 (1993) (warning that offers that are "too attractive may blind prospective subjects to the risks
or impair their ability to exercise proper judgment" about the risks of participation in research).
Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 184, at 391.
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research. Working life often involves inducements and in particular
sometimes involves inducements for engaging in risky working
behavior (so-called "danger money") . . . If we are to complain about
inducement in research, it seems apt to consider it elsewhere as well. 2 1 1
Thus, without research exceptionalism, it is difficult to show that anything is
wrong with the use of offers of payment merely to induce participation in
research. In contrast, it is consistent with views of offers of payment outside of
research to be concerned when amounts are so high as to cause people to behave
irrationally in ways that could result in unreasonable harm.
What are the practical implications of this definition? According to
Emanuel, "[u]ndue inducement cannot occur in otherwise ethical clinical
research because there is no possibility of excessive risks, of assuming risks a
reasonable person would not assume." 2 12 This is because IRB approval is
conditioned on a determination that a study has a favorable risk-benefit ratio,
completely independent of any offer of payment, and a person could reasonably
decide to participate.2 13 IRBs "are required to determine that any risks of serious
harm are offset or outweighed by either the prospect of individual benefit or by
the value of the knowledge that the trial is designed to generate." 214 Even when
the social value of a proposed study is very high, IRBs must ensure that risks to
individual participants have been minimized. Thus, according to Emanuel, once a
protocol has been approved by an IRB, it is essentially by definition a reasonable
proposal to put before potential participants.
Nonetheless, because an IRB is approving a protocol for a general
population, and not evaluating the circumstances of individual participants, we
suggest that it remains possible that in some cases, an individual's particular
circumstances might make his or her participation in an approved study
unreasonable, i.e., the result of bad judgment. In other words, it is possible that
participation is against the individual interest of any particular research
participant.2 15 One might, for example, think of a devout Jehovah's Witness who
is considering participating in an IRB-approved study that requires receiving a
blood transfusion because it is high paying.216 For this reason, we do not ascribe
to Emanuel's view that undue inducements cannot occur in otherwise ethical
211. Wilson & Hunter, supra note 124, at 50.
212. Emanuel, supra note 24, at 11.
213. Id.
214. Alex John London, Undue Inducements and Reasonable Risks: Will the Dismal Science
Lead to Dismal Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHIcS 29, 30 (2005).
215. Participants might also be motivated to lie in order to participate in research, thereby
skirting IRB protections.










However, we do think they are relatively unlikely to occur. This is because
situations in which an individual's interests may be so unique as to fall
completely outside of the risks and benefits evaluated by the IRB are likely to be
rare. A default position of encouraging highly restrictive approaches to offers of
payment in research-intended to forestall undue inducements-is, therefore,
inappropriate if IRB review functions as intended, i.e., as a bulwark against
unethical research.
3. Coercive Offers
Professor Joan McGregor flatly rejects Emanuel's four-part definition of
undue inducement as "wrong."2 18 She counters, "Only the first condition from his
list, that a good is offered in exchange for something, is necessary for undue
inducement. The other conditions are too vague to be useful or are clearly not
necessary conditions."21 9
McGregor instead favors defining undue inducements as "coercive
offers."2 20 Notably, this seemingly eliminates undue inducement as a distinct
concept and places McGregor back in the discussion of coercion above.-From
McGregor's perspective, the prohibition against undue inducements is intended
to guard against taking advantage of vulnerable populations, including
impoverished persons with few, if any, alternatives.22 1 Note the similarity of this
position to the view of coercion as simply having no reasonable alternative. For
reasons discussed above, we find this definition untenable.
4. Empirical Evidence of Undue Inducement
Once undue inducement is defined to include distortion of a person's
rational risk assessment as a necessary condition, we have an empirical question:
does such distortion actually occur in practice? Importantly, available empirical
research suggests that it may not. To the contrary, some studies indicate that
offers of payment draw prospective research participants' attention to risks
(rather than causing risks to be ignored), while other studies have found no
association between offers of payment and perceived research risk.
Cynthia Cryder and colleagues found that while higher offers of payment
increased willingness to participate, these offers also increased perceived risk and
217. Emily A. Largent & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Paying Research Participants: The Outsized
Influence of "Undue Influence ", 39 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. _ (forthcoming 2017).
218. McGregor, supra note 190 (suggesting that Emanuel's account fails to capture our
intuitions about Joel Feinberg's "lecherous millionaire" example, in which a millionaire offers to
pay for a sick boy's medical care if his impoverished mother will be the millionaire's mistress).
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the time spent reviewing information about research-related risks.222 Jacquelyn
Slomka and colleagues conducted in-depth interviews with individuals taking
part in three HIV prevention studies. 223 While the interviewees saw money as a
necessary incentive to attract research participants, at least some expressed a
belief that large financial incentives might raise concerns about risks.224 Scott
Halpern and colleagues found that, although higher payment motivates research
participation, there was no evidence that higher payments altered patient's
perceptions of the risks of research participation, that is, their comprehension.2 25
John Bentley and P.G. Thacker determined that higher levels of payment increase
willingness to participate, but, perhaps counter intuitively, there was no
association between monetary payment and perceived risk. 226 Finally, Eleanor
Singer and Mick Couper conducted an online vignette-based survey and
concluded that while larger incentives induced greater overall participation,
"respondents do not appear to exchange higher incentives for greater risks."22 7
Although more data are needed, these studies do not indicate that higher payment
necessarily or even frequently leads to cognitive distortion regarding the risks of
research participation.
That said, however, empirical evidence does suggest that higher payments
may prompt research participants to lie, deceive, or otherwise conceal
information from investigators.2 28 Some individuals interviewed by Slomka and
colleagues "believed that if a large amount of money was offered, individuals
would be more likely to provide false information to investigators and 'say
anything' to obtain the money." 229 Bentley and Thacker's study "showed that
222. Cynthia E. Cryder et al., Informative Inducement: Study Payment as a Signal of Risk, 70
Soc. ScI. & MED. 455 (2010).
223. Jacquelyn Slomka et al., Perceptions of Financial Payment for Research Participation
among African-American Drug Users in HIV Studies, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1403 (2007).
224. Id. at 1405 ("In response to questions about monetary influences on risk assessment, some
respondents said they would participate in a study if the price was right in spite of the risks,
whereas others said they would decline certain risky studies no matter what amount of money was
offered.").
225. Scott D. Halpern et al., Empirical Assessment of Whether Moderate Payments are Undue
or Unjust Inducements for Participation in Clinical Trials, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 801, 803
(2004).
226. John P. Bentley & Paul G. Thacker, The Influence of Risk and Monetary Payment on the
Research Participation Decision Making Process, 30 J. MED. ETHICS. 293, 296-297 (2004).
227. Eleanor Singer & Mick P. Couper, Do Incentives Exert Undue Influence on Survey
Participation? Experimental Evidence, 3 J. EMPrRIcAL RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 49, 53 (2008).
228. Investigators who responded to our pilot survey, described in Part V, raised this as a
concern. For example, one respondent explained: "Recruiting through Craigslist or other online
methods seems to draw a lot of people who are unduly influenced by the compensation, to the point
that they will lie about their medical history." Another stated, 'Professional subjects' are very
problematic for us. They lie during the screening process in order to get into the study, they have
poor compliance, and their data messes up our findings. For this reason, we compensate as little as
possible, to decrease the number of these subjects that we enroll."
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higher levels of monetary payment may influence subjects' behaviors regarding
concealing information about restricted activities."23 0 They expressed concern
that "[I]f such activities were actually engaged in, the results of the hypothetical
studies may have been distorted."231 In our view, this act of deception may
indicate a distorted understanding of risks or an unreasonable willingness to
assume risks of participation, for example, by circumventing exclusion criteria or
lying about adverse events that could lead to disqualification. Thus, some
concern about undue inducement in practice remains.2 32
Nonetheless, we note that "[w]orkers may lie about their qualifications too,
in ways that put both themselves and their employers' output in jeopardy, and
they may be enticed to do so by money."233 Without research exceptionalism, the
fact that highly-compensated research participants might be more likely to lie
than unpaid or less-compensated research participants cannot justify a limit on
compensation to research participants but not for other jobs. The immediate
response to deceit by research participants should not be to reduce payment.
Regulatory oversight bodies, sponsors, and investigators "could implement
national subject registries to track participants [to avoid duplicative enrollment
for financial gain], . . . utilize more extensive screening before enrollment [to
better check against inclusion/exclusion criteria], and increase use of physical
testing rather than relying on qualitative subject feedback whenever possible."234
In some instances, it may be necessary to limit payment to avoid the problems
entailed by deceitful research participants, but these cannot justify blanket limits
on offers of payment in all clinical research.235
C. The Relationship Between Coercion and Undue Inducement
On one view, coercion and undue inducement are not distinct concepts, but
rather fall on a sliding scale, with one being a more extreme version of the other.
This view purports that the "quantity of payment is directly correlated with the
'pressure' on the decision-maker, and the threshold of pressure necessary to
constitute undue influence is less than the threshold of pressure necessary to
constitute coercion." 236 The sliding scale view is intuitively appealing and may be
implied by some of the leading regulatory and ethical guidelines, like the U.S.
Common Rule, which mention coercion and undue inducement together and do
not draw a clear conceptual distinction between them.237
230. Bentley & Thacker, supra note 226, at 297.
231. Id.
232. Largent & Lynch, supra note 217.
233. Lynch, supra note 51, at 162.
234. Id. (internal citations omitted).
235. Largent & Lynch, supra note 217.
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Nevertheless, we join others in forcefully arguing for distinguishing undue
inducement and coercion as distinct concepts. Emanuel, for instance, contends
that "[u]ndue inducement is the diametric opposite of coercion. While both make
a person do what may be unethical, illegal, or imprudent, the former dangles a
good, a positive offer to induce bad judgment that leads to harm, while the latter
entails an overwhelming threat.... Coercion requires a threat of what the person
considers a worse consequence, while undue inducement offers a positive
good." 23 8 Additionally, whereas undue inducement may compromise the validity
of consent by creating a cognitive distortion and impairing comprehension,
coercion compromises the voluntariness of consent by the threat of harm.239
Additional support for the argument that these are distinct concepts may be
found in the legal rules, or canons, of statutory interpretation. It is a "cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word will be
superfluous, void, nugatory, or insignificant." 240 In the case of the Common Rule,
quoted above, this would favor understanding coercion and undue inducement as
distinct concepts, rather than one as an extreme form of the other. Moreover, as
discussed above, both the Belmont Report and OHRP's FAQs distinguish
conceptually coercion from undue influence.
In this section, we have illustrated the lack of definitional consensus within
the bioethics community pertaining to coercion and undue inducement. The
conceptual definitions are highly variable, and as a result, different individuals
reviewing an offer of payment may reach different conclusions in practice about
whether that offer is coercive or unduly influential, and in turn, whether it is
ethically permissible or impermissible. Moreover, it is easy to see that, depending
on how two individuals define the respective terms, they could talk past one
another. They may be using the same term to refer to different ethical concerns;
different terms to refer to the same concern; or different terms to refer to different
concerns.
Clearly, it is desirable for the human subjects research community to come
to consensus on what these terms mean. We have argued that once one rejects
research exceptionalism, certain definitions come to the fore, as depicted in
Figure 2. Yet, even if one continues to defend research exceptionalism with
regard to payment, it is possible to endorse our preferred definitions on the
238. Emanuel, supra note 200, at 101 ("The 'your money or your life' threat of coercion is
clearly different from the $1 million offer of undue inducement.").
239. Largent et al., supra note 29, at 506; see also Wilkinson & Moore, supra note 196, at 378
("Coercion is paradigmatically a case of the denial of autonomy, since it consists in the deliberate
imposition of one person's will on another. However, coercion usually takes the form of threats,
which restrict people's options. Inducements are offers, not threats, and they expand people's
options.").
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grounds of their superior explanatory power and consistency with the canon of
non-surplusage.
Coercion
* A threat to violate rights or not fulfill an obligation + no reasonable alternative
0 Affects voluntariness
0 Not implicated by genuine offers
0 Possible in research but not caused by offers of payment
Undue Inducement
* Offer of positive, excessive incentive + bad judgment leading to undesirable
activities (against one's self-defined interests)
0 May affect comprehension of risks
0 Limited empirical evidence of undue inducement in practice
0 Unlikely in IRB-approved research
Figure 2. Best Definitions of Coercion and Undue Inducement
V. CASE STUDY: CONFUSION IN PRACTICE
As the preceding sections have highlighted, it is reasonable to expect that the
lack of substantive guidance regarding offers of payment from key regulatory
agencies and other influential bodies in research ethics, the misguided tendency
toward research exceptionalism, and the want of clarity about how to define
coercion and undue influence will result in conceptual confusion among IRBs
and investigators, as well as a general trend toward conservative approaches to
payment. In this section, we present preliminary research that illustrates precisely
such confusion and an emphasis on protecting subjects from payments that are
deemed to be "too high." The purpose of this case study is to show that the
challenges identified herein are not just theoretical, but can have concrete effects
in practice.
A. Institutional Guidelines
IRBs-and the institutions with which they are affiliated-have wide
discretion when it comes to overseeing offers of payment made to research
participants. As a result, one finds predictably wide variation in institutional
policies. As part of this project, we reviewed payment-related policies for all of
the IRBs affiliated with Harvard Catalyst. Harvard Catalyst, Harvard's Clinical
and Translational Science Center, is part of the National Clinical and
Translational Science Award (CTSA) consortium241 and "works with Harvard
241. Sixty medical research institutions are members of the CTSA Consortium, which is funded
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schools and the academic healthcare centers (hospitals) to build and grow an
environment where discoveries are rapidly and efficiently translated to improve
human health."242
In 2015, we reviewed official copies of policies and guidelines regarding
payment of research participants for each of the Harvard Catalyst-affiliated
institutions.2 43 Although we do not suggest that these institutions provide a
representative sample of research institutions across the country, they do range
from world-renowned academic medical centers to local community hospitals.
Because the goal is simply to demonstrate variety, rather than to praise or
criticize any institution's policy, we refrain in this discussion from attributing
particular policies to particular institutions.2 44
Several of the Harvard Catalyst-affiliated institutions share umbrella IRBs
(and therefore were covered by a single policy). In all, six institutions had no
policy governing offers of payment to research participants, whereas 13 IRBs
(covering the remainder of the participating institutions) did have a payment-
specific policy or policies.24 5 Of those with policies, there is a great deal of
heterogeneity: whereas some largely parrot the regulations, others go into much
more extensive detail. In Appendix 1, we have compiled information about each
of these policies on a range of parameters.
When an institution has a policy regarding offers of payment to research
participants, that policy can reasonably be expected to establish the default for
how payment is viewed by both RB members and investigators. Two policies
were particularly striking in their contrast. The first of these stated: "It is
sometimes desirable to provide payments to subjects and their families for their
participation in research projects."24 6 By contrast, the second stated:
It is not necessary, required, or desirable that all subjects involved in
clinical research receive monetary compensation for their participation.
Some subjects derive medical benefit as a result of their participation;
some subjects volunteer out of sheer altruism . . . or for other personal
reasons. 247
The former sets a default that is much more favorable to offers of payment
by the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), a part of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). National CTSA Consortium, HARV. CATALYST,
http://catalyst.harvard.edu/about/consortium.html [https://perma.cc/CA5T-83TH].
242. About Harvard Catalyst, HARv. CATALYST, http://catalyst.harvard.edu/about
[https://perma.cc/J6WF-W5YQ].
243. There are thirty-one participating institutions. Id.
244. Policies are on file with the authors.
245. This is consistent with the findings presented in Neal Dickert et al., Paying Research
Subjects: An Analysis of Current Policies, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 368, 369 (2002).
246. See infra app. at pp. 132-34 (Institution A).




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol17/iss1/2
PAYING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
than the latter, and also seems to be more in line with approaches to payment that
might be expected outside of the research context, whereas the latter appears to
be influenced by research exceptionalism.
In reviewing these policies, we observed several trends relevant to our
present discussion. First, and most notably, the vast majority of policies do not
include definitions of either coercion or undue inducement, despite (or perhaps
because of) the fact that these terms are not clearly defined in the U.S. federal
regulations, nor are there broadly accepted definitions in the research ethics
literature. There were two notable exceptions. The first defines coercion, roughly
correctly, as "undue pressure."2 48 The second, however, suggests coercion means
"unduly inducing individuals to participate because compensation would be
difficult to refuse." 249 Not only is this definition of coercion clearly incorrect on
our preferred definitions, it mistakenly conflates coercion with undue influence,
suggesting the terms are interchangeable when they are correctly understood as
distinct.
Second, the policies reviewed also reflected the widespread-albeit
mistaken on our view-belief that offers of payment can be coercive. One policy
states, for instance: "Payment should not be coercive."250 Another explains,
"When subjects are being paid, the [IRB] will review both the amount of
payment and the proposed method and timing of disbursement to assure that
neither is coercive." 251' A third states, "The IRB reviews remuneration plans to
assess whether the amount, schedule and type of any proposed compensation ...
could be considered coercive." 25 2 As we have stressed above, genuine offers of
payment are never coercive because they do not threaten to violate an
individual's rights but instead expand an individual's options.
Third, the policies generally allowed advertisements to indicate that payment
would be offered, as long as undue emphasis was not placed on the offer of
payment. 253 A typical policy stated, "[A]dvertisements may state that Human
Subjects will be paid, but should not emphasize the payment or the amount to be
paid, by such means as larger or bold type." 254 None of the polices we reviewed
expressly forbade inclusion of payment nor did they require that offers of
payment be explicitly mentioned in the advertising materials. While the policies
do not explicitly link limits on advertising to either coercion or undue
inducement, presumably such limits are motivated by a fear that research
248. Id.
249. See infra app. at pp. 135-136 (Institution F). Undue influence was never defined by this
policy.
250. See infra app. at pp. 139-141 (Institution L).
251. See infra app. at pp. 139-141 (Institution K).
252. See infra app. at pp. 135-136 (Institution F).
253. See generally Megan S. Wright & Christopher T. Robertson, Heterogeneity in IRB Policies
with Regard to Disclosures About Payment for Participation in Recruitment Materials, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHics 375, 375-376 (2014).
254. See infra app. at pp. 132-134 (Institution C) (emphasis added).
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participants could be inappropriately influenced to participate in research by an
emphasis on payment in advertising materials. Given our view on the broad
acceptability of offers of payment made to research participants, we believe
policies that allow inclusion of reasonable information about payment at the
investigators' discretion are not only appropriate but ideal.
Of course, we understand the difficulty of drafting these policies in the
absence of clear regulatory guidance and the presence of robust academic debate.
The confusion they reflect is reasonable given the confused circumstances from
which they emerge. Ideally, however, institutions would bridge the gap between
policy and practice, defining crucial terms and providing substantive guidance on
ethically acceptable offers of payment that could guide investigators and IRB
members as they design and evaluate offers of payment made to research
participants. There is, as we have shown, an unfortunate divergence between the
ideal and reality. While this divergence is neither unexpected nor blameworthy,
the lack of clear institutional guidance, layered upon a lack of clear regulatory
guidance, likely reinforces a tendency toward conservative approaches to
payment among IRB members and investigators.
B. Individual Survey Data
In addition to a review of institutional policies, we conducted pilot surveys
of individuals at Harvard Catalyst-affiliated research institutions in order to
develop preliminary data about attitudes of both IRB members and investigators
regarding payment generally, and about their beliefs regarding coercion and
undue inducement in particular. This is the first survey to assess how
investigators, as opposed to IRB members alone, define these terms.
We included investigators in our sample because they are responsible for
designing-and oftentimes justifying-the offer of payment that is submitted to
the IRB for review. While factors extrinsic to ethical concerns about coercion
and undue influence, most notably the study budget, will influence how much
payment an investigator offers, their understanding of coercion and undue
influence may be relevant, as well as their expectations regarding likely IRB
response. Furthermore, it is useful to know how much daylight there is between
the perspectives of IRB members and investigators on these issues to determine
how best to address conservative approaches to payment moving forward.
1. Methods
Two online surveys were conducted. The first (hereafter, the "IRB Survey")
was sent to IRB members and administrators and was distributed via the Harvard
Catalyst Regulatory Committee, which "is comprised of institutional officials,
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Catalyst-participating institutions."255 The second survey (hereafter, the
"Investigator Survey") was sent to investigators and study coordinators and
distributed via the Harvard Catalyst Clinical Research Center (HCCRC) email
list.25 6
Two draft survey instruments, one for IRB members and one for
investigators, were developed using an iterative process that began with a
comprehensive review of the literature on coercion and undue inducement and
offers of payment to research participants and included several rounds of revision
based on input from IRB members, administrators, and experts on the ethics of
human subjects research. Because much of our work was exploratory in nature,
we used a combination of open- and close-ended questions. The draft surveys
were pretested with IRB members, administrators, and investigators who were
asked to comment on the content and design of the survey. Feedback was
incorporated to refine and clarify survey items. The Investigator Survey was
finalized after we had the results from the IRB Survey, and several additional
changes were made to further enhance clarity.257
Potential participants received an email embedded with an HTML link to the
confidential, self-administered survey instrument, which was administered in
Qualtrics, a web-based survey tool. Two subsequent reminder emails were sent.
Responses received by June 1, 2015 were included in our analysis. This project
was approved by the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects, the IRB for
Harvard University's Cambridge campus. No compensation was provided to
participants.
Because this study was designed as an exploratory analysis, we summarized
data using frequency distributions and descriptive statistics. We evaluated
associations between responses using simple frequencies and evaluated the
interrelationships between survey response items using cross-tabulations without
adjustment for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance by chi-square test
was defined asp < 0.05.
2. Results and Analysis
Of the 694 emailed invitations to participate in the IRB survey, 116 surveys
were completed, for a response rate of 16.7%.258 Of the 1,596 emailed invitations
255. Regulatory Foundations, Ethics, and Law Program, HARV. CATALYST,
https://catalyst.harvard.edu/programs/regulatory/howwework.html [https://permacc/YL4H-XM3T].
256. Harvard Catalyst Clinical Research Center (HCCRC), HARV. CATALYST,
https://catalyst.harvard.edu/programs/hccrc [https://perma.cc/DA6U-M4G4].
257. Survey instruments on file with the author.
258. Some of the IRBs made the members' emails publicly available or shared them upon
request; in other cases, the IRB chair agreed to forward our emails. As we did not send all of the
email invitations directly, we are unsure how many emails were returned as undeliverable and how
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to participate in the investigator survey, 115 surveys were completed, for a
response rate of 7.2%.259
Respondents who provided demographic information were predominately
non-Hispanic white (90%) and female (62%), with a mean age of 54 (+13) for
IRB members and administrators and a median age of 41-50 for investigators. 26 0
The majority of respondents (76%) held a masters, doctorate, or professional
degree. Those with experience serving on an IRB had an average of 8 (±6) years
of experience, and all but 7% said that their IRB reviewed biomedical research.
Investigators reported submitting an average of 14 (±20) protocols to their
current IRB. All respondents held a role or roles related to human subjects
research (see Table 1).
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259. As we did not send any of these email invitations directly, we are unsure how many emails
were returned as undeliverable. Therefore, the adjusted response rate may be higher.
260. The CUHS asked us to change how we asked questions about age between the two studies,
which is why the results are reported differently.
1 17:1 (2017)
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Respondents' Current Roles Related to Human Subjects Research
Role* Frequency Percent
Researcher 85 36.8%
IRB Member 91 39.4%
Study Coordinator 54 23.4%
Research Nurse 6 2.6%





Subject Recruiter 11 4.8%
Evaluate Grants 14 6.1%
Write Policy 16 6.9%
Member of Human Research Protection Program 14 6.1%
Other Study Staff 10 4.3%
Other 16 6.9%
*Respondents could choose more than one role
Beyond these demographics, however, we will generally present the results
for investigators and IRB members together because there were few instances in
which the differences in their answers reached statistical significance; where the
difference was statistically significant, we have included a footnote indicating
that to be the case. This is an interesting fimding in itself because it shows that
IRB members and investigators think about coercion and undue influence in
similar ways.
Respondents were asked to select which of a given series of definitions
properly defined coercion, and were permitted to select more than one option; we
did not indicate which definition reflected our preferred view. See Table 2.
Nearly all respondents agreed that a research participant is coerced if threatened
with harm or loss of benefits to which he is otherwise entitled if he doesn't
119
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participate in research (87.0%),261 a definition consistent with the rights-violating
view of coercion we endorse. The vast majority also agreed that a research
participant is coerced if he participates as the result of intimidation, or some other
form of pressure or force (90.0%), consistent with the worse-off view. While we
favor the rights-violating view, for reasons discussed above, there is often little
difference between the two views in practice. These results are encouraging in
the sense that they indicate that most respondents include the correct (by our
analysis) definitions of coercion in their understanding of the term.
Less encouraging, however, is that respondents might also be including
incorrect definitions. A majority agreed that a research participant is coerced if
the offer of payment causes him to feel he has no reasonable alternative but to
participate in research (71.0%), if the offer of payment distorts his ability to
perceive accurately the risks and benefits of research (63.6%),262 or if the offer of
payment makes him participate in research he would not otherwise participate in
(51.1%). From our perspective, that a majority of respondents would endorse
these definitions demonstrates a widespread and fundamental misunderstanding
of what coercion is. With respect to the first option, although some ethicists
defend the no-reasonable-alternative view of coercion, we indicated above why
this approach is inconsistent with understandings of what counts as coercive
outside of the research context, and why it must be rejected as an instance of
inappropriate research exceptionalism. The second option, that offers of payment
may distort comprehension of risks and benefits is the correct definition for
undue inducement, not for coercion. This illustrates how the two terms are often
conflated. Finally, the third option is consistent not with coercion but with an
ethically unproblematic mere inducement. More than two-thirds (68.6%) of
respondents agreed with the following statement, which we view to be false:
"Offers of payment can be coercive."
Next, respondents were given the same series of definitions and asked which
defined undue influence. See Table 2. Three-quarters (74.5%) of respondents
agreed that a research participant is unduly influenced if the offer of payment
distorts his ability to perceive accurately the risks and benefits of research, which
means that a full quarter of respondents failed to identify what we view to be the
correct definition of undue inducement. It is perhaps most worrisome that more
than half of the respondents (58.9%) agreed that research participants are unduly
influenced if the offer of payment makes them participate in research they would
not otherwise participate in. Again, this seems more accurately to describe a mere
261. Investigators were significantly more likely than IRB members (p < 0.05) to say that a
research participant was coerced if threatened with harm or loss of benefits to which he is otherwise
entitled (92.2% vs. 81.7%). Thus, investigators were more likely to get it right in our view.
262. Investigators were significantly more likely than IRB members (p < 0.05) to say that a
research participant was coerced if an offer of payment distorts the research participant's ability to
perceive accurately the risks and benefits of research, which is part of our definition of undue
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inducement (i.e., something that one would not otherwise have done), not one
that is undue per se, and is an expansive view potentially at odds with the
pervasive use of offers of payment as an incentive for participation in research.
In these numbers, we again see evidence that IRB members and investigators
often conflate undue influence and coercion. The majority agreed that research
participants are unduly influenced if they participate as the result of intimidation,
or some other form of pressure or force (60.6%)263 or if they are threatened with
harm or loss of benefits to which they are otherwise entitled if they do not
participate in research (55.8%),2" both of which are definitions applicable
instead to coercion.
Table 2.
Definitions of Coercion and Undue Inducement
% of respondents who agreed Then. . . Then ...
that if... it is coercion it is undue inducement
The research participant is
threatened with harm or loss of 87.0% 55.8%
benefits to which he is otherwise
entitled if he doesn't participate
in research
The research participant
participates as the result of 90.0% 60.6%
intimidation, or some other form
of pressure or force
The offer of payment makes the
research participant participate 51.1% 58.9%
in research he would not
otherwise participate in
The offer of payment distorts the
research participant's ability to 63.6% 74.5%
perceive accurately the risks and
benefits of research
The offer of payment causes the
research participant to feel he 71.0% 69.3%
263. Investigators were significantly more likely than IRB members (p < 0.05) to say that a
research participant was unduly induced if she participates as the result of intimidation, or some
other form of pressure or force (69.8% vs. 51.3%), which is instead one of our definitions of
coercion.
264. Investigators were significantly more likely than IRB members (p < 0.05) to say that a
research participant was unduly induced if threatened with harm or loss of benefits to which they
are otherwise entitled (64.7% vs. 47.0%), which is instead one of our definitions of coercion.
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has no reasonable alternative but
to participate in research
Undue inducement and coercion are often said to be conflated,265 a claim
consistent with our findings. Our data suggest that people use these terms
somewhat interchangeably. Some individuals chose the same definitions for both
coercion and undue inducement. Moreover, a majority of respondents (65.2%)
agreed with the statement that "coercion is an extreme form of undue influence,"
consistent with the "sliding scale view" and demonstrating a failure to appreciate
that coercion and undue inducement are distinct concepts. 26 6
Finally, two-thirds (67.4%) of respondents agreed with the statement
"offering to pay subjects is different from offering to pay people in other
contexts." This finding is consistent with widespread research exceptionalism,
which may, in addition to confusion about how to define the key terms,
encourage conservative approaches to payment.
3. Limitations
This was an exploratory study without a nationally representative sample
and with a low response rate, which imposes limits on the conclusions we can
draw. While the respondents are professionally diverse and have considerable
experience in human subjects research, they may have views that differ from
others involved in the research enterprise, especially given that our results were
generated exclusively from Harvard Catalyst-affiliated research institutions. Yet,
as mentioned above, Harvard Catalyst encompasses institutions ranging from
academic medical centers to community hospitals to schools of medicine and
public health.
Another limitation to this exploratory data is that we asked about concepts
only in the abstract, rather than including case studies. Thus, it is possible that
even if IRB members and investigators adopt overly expansive definitions of
coercion and undue inducement when asked about these terms in the abstract,
these definitions have little impact on their decisions to approve or not approve
offers of payment in specific instances. Yet, the federal Common Rule requires
investigators to seek informed "consent only under circumstances. . .that
minimize the possibility for coercion or undue influence,"267 and OHRP cautions
investigators and IRBs to "be vigilant about minimizing the possibility of
265. E.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Undue Inducement in Clinical Research in Developing
Countries, 366 LANCET 336, 337 (2005) (describing how it is not unusual for undue inducement to
be "conflated with coercion, exploitation, injustice, deception, misunderstanding, and other ethical
transgressions as if they were equivalent or interchangeable").
266. Largent, Grady, Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 29, at 506.
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coercion or undue influence."268 Therefore, although more research is needed, we
hypothesize that these confused views do influence how IRBs interpret offers of
payment as well as how investigators structure offers of payment.
In response to our pilot survey, some IRB members and investigators readily
admitted to their confusion,2 69 and many others showed themselves to have a
faulty conceptual understanding of coercion and undue inducement on our
preferred definitions. Some respondents identified the best definitions while also
endorsing incorrect views, suggesting that their understanding of these concepts
is overly expansive. In some instances, respondents identified a legitimate ethical
concern but called it by the wrong name. In other instances, they expressed
concern about something that is not a legitimate ethical concern at all, but called
it by an ethically charged name.
.As a result, we fear that lIRBs sometimes incorrectly reject offers of payment
that really ought to be ethically acceptable, thereby eliminating a potentially
important tool in clinical trial recruitment. The flip-side of this is that
investigators share many of the misconceptions that IRB members have-not
only do investigators have the same dearth of guidance on what these terms
mean, they may also be reliant on the IRB to guide them in how to understand
and apply these terms. As a result, they may not submit protocols with offers of
payment that they expect will be met unfavorably by the IRB, or may fail to
advocate for offers of payment once the IRB has questioned them, even when
those payments really ought to be viewed as ethically acceptable.
While preliminary, our results suggest that guidance and educational efforts
targeted at both IRB members and investigators are needed to clarify coercion
and undue inducement and to address research exceptionalism if we are to
advance the goals of research ethics to promote socially valuable research while
providing appropriate protections for research participants.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE: THE PATH FORWARD
Given the potential for confusion and conservative approaches to payment
demonstrated above, it is clear that something must be done. Here, we will
consider several possible solutions to the problems we have identified.
A. IfNot Accuracy, Precision
In the field of science, accuracy tells us how close a measurement is to the
true value. Precision, by contrast, refers to the closeness of two or more
268. Office of Human Research Prots., supra note 90.
269. For instance, a handful (5%) of respondents to the IRB survey explicitly stated that they
were not certain how to define undue influence in answer to a free response question.
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measurements to each other.270 Unfortunately, our data suggests that currently
when TRB members and investigators define and use the terms coercion and
undue inducement, they are often neither accurate nor precise. While we have
argued above for the definitions that we think are best, we also recognize that
reasonable disagreement is possible. In the face of disagreement among ethicists
about what each of these concepts mean, it seems unrealistic-at least in the
absence of a definitive statement from OHRP or FDA, which we discuss
below-to ask that IRB members and investigators universally accept one
meaning as factually correct. This may be particularly difficult, given an
ingrained culture of payment conservatism. Therefore, accuracy might be too
much to hope for, but precision is not.
How might we achieve precision? As a first step, we propose relying much
less on these labels to do the heavy lifting. It appears from our data and some
strands of the bioethics literature that the terms coercion and undue inducement
may be used as "catchalls" when something about research (e.g., an offer of
payment) seems somehow not right. Because most everyone agrees that coercion
and undue inducement in the context of human subjects research are wrong, use
of these terms can be a conversation killer and result in not approving a protocol
or an aspect of a protocol. Yet, to the extent that people understand these terms
expansively or understand them in wildly different ways, people may well be
talking past one another when these terms are used. Therefore, leveling the
charge that an offer of payment is coercive or unduly influential should be the
beginning, rather than the end, of the conversation. Individuals interested in
protecting research participants should explain precisely why they think that a
particular payment is problematic rather than assuming that the label alone does
sufficient explanatory work, or that the label itself will carry the same meaning
for the listener as it does for the speaker.
So, for example, instead of saying that a proposed offer of payment would
create undue inducement, it would be vastly preferable to say that a proposed
offer of payment appears so high that it might prevent prospective research
participants from adequately evaluating the risks and burdens of enrolling in the
associated trial, while also offering specific evidence for why that worry is
present in this particular case. Employing that level of specificity will limit the
extent to which individuals talk past each other and allow the conversation to be
focused on the ethical concern at hand. To continue with the example, once the
concern is expressed as money impinging on the evaluation of risks, it is possible
to have a substantive discussion about whether the offer of payment is so high
that it predictably creates a cognitive distortion, whether the research is otherwise
ethical such that a reasonable person could agree to participate, or whether
270. Imagine you have a box that you know weighs exactly 10 pounds. You take it home and
weigh it five times on your bathroom scale. Each time, the scale says that the box weighs 7.5
pounds. Your scale is precise because it said that the box weighed 7.5 pounds each time, but your
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additional safeguards are needed for the informed consent process. Such
questions would, for example, have been useful to assess prospectively the offer
of payment made to research participants in France.
B. Changing the Default Rules to Favor Payment
As described above, we think that research exceptionalism is generally
wrongheaded when it comes to offers of payment, and that offers of payment do
not need to be subjected to greater scrutiny in the research context than
elsewhere. If so, that is a strong argument in favor of changing the default to
generally accept even high offers of payment to research participants unless there
is compelling evidence that they are harmful. Even if one continues to accept
some form of research exceptionalism, if coercion and undue inducement are not
actually happening in practice when payment is offered to participants, then we
are making mountains out of molehills when we set the default in favor of low
(or no payment).
We have argued that coercion is incorrectly associated with genuine offers
of payment. While undue inducement is a more credible concern when offers of
payment are extended to research participants, we caution that there is little
evidence that undue inducement is occurring in practice. As described above,
empirical research has failed to substantiate the claim that offers of payment lead
to irrational choices by research participants. In fact, some scholars have found
that offers of payment heighten subjects' attention to the risks and burdens of
research participation. We suggest that many regulators, IRBs, investigators, and
other stakeholders in human subjects research are, therefore, inappropriately
concerned about offers of payment being too high in most cases. Offers of
payment, even extremely high ones, should not generally be cause for ethical
concern.
From our perspective, the larger concern is that subjects may be
inadequately compensated for their contribution to socially beneficial research,
which may slow recruitment, hinder retention, or exploit research participants
who are not paid enough. According to Wertheimer, to exploit someone is to take
unfair advantage of him or her.271 Exploitation occurs when, due to an
asymmetry of bargaining power, one party to a transaction insufficiently benefits
or assumes an unfair share of the burden relative to other parties to the
transaction. The possibility of exploitation suggests that a default in favor of
payment is preferable to a default against payment.
At a minimum, individuals "should not have to pay for making a
contribution to the social good of research."27 2 This entails providing
reimbursement for any research-related expenses they incur and adequate
compensation for their time and effort, as well as risks they willingly incur as a
271. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 22-23 (1996).
272. CIOMS, supra note 25, at 65.
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result of their participation in research. Such offers of payment demonstrate
respect for research participants, and treat them in accordance to what would be
expected outside the research context. In some studies, acceptable offers of
payment may be de minimus (e.g., a study that consists of a one-time blood
draw), but in other studies, the minimum acceptable payment may be
substantially higher.
Additionally, offers of payment can unproblematically be used to incentivize
research participation. We think it is fundamentally wrong to argue, as some
have, that "the need for large incentives can be a rough indicator that there may
be an ethical concern that requires attention."273 People may simply wish to avoid
the discomforts or burdens of research participation, and just as incentives are
acceptable in other areas of life to override such reluctance, they are acceptable
in the context of human subjects research-particularly if one accepts, as we do,
the role of a well-functioning IRB in determining that the risks of a study are
reasonable in relation to the benefits, either to the individual or to society.
We do note that some people worry "that poverty or otherwise compromised
circumstances may force people to take an inducement that people in a better
situation shun."274 This concern is often raised when research is conducted in
developing countries, but its application is not geographically limited. Yet,
"tempting offers in desperate situations that have clear good results are not undue
inducements"27 5 because accepting such an offer can be a reasoned judgment that
does not necessarily contradict one's interests. It is an unfortunate consequence
of research exceptionalism to frame these offers as undue inducements, and it
would be unacceptably paternalistic to protect competent research participants
from their fully voluntary and rational undertakings. Moreover, it is backward to
think that protecting them requires paying less in light of their poverty; ideally,
the response should be to pay them more.
To demonstrate this point, consider that a person who is facing poverty
might be willing to work as a day laborer, which may be risky and burdensome,
whereas a more affluent person would not be willing to do so. Of course, this
does not mean day laborers should be paid less. If we think paid day labor is
acceptable, then it is an instance of research exceptionalism to suggest that paid
research participation is unacceptable simply because more affluent individuals
may not find participation a compelling offer, given other options they have
available. The factors that lead some people to participate in research in order to
earn a living or supplement their income might be circumstances we would all
think of as unjust, and would prefer not to have occurred, but those
circumstances are not reasons to limit the options of competent adults given the
realities-and other protections for research participants-that exist.
273. Grant & Sugarman, supra note 24, at 734.
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Additionally, although we do not think offers of payment are a panacea for
recruitment problems, greater incentives may have the dual benefit of improving
enrollment and drawing a more diverse pool of research participants. This could
ensure that socially valuable research is completed and that the burdens and
benefits of research participation are spread more broadly, more fairly over the
population. While more empirical research is needed to determine the effect of
offers of payment on participation,26 lack of completion due to low enrollment is
known to be a problem. A 2015 study of 787 cancer trials, for example, found
that 18% closed with low accrual or were accruing at less than 50% of target
three years or more after initiation.2 7 7 A review of terminated trials in
clinicaltrials.gov found that insufficient rate of accrual was a leading reason for
trial termination.2 78 Additionally, and contrary to the logic that only the poor
participate in trials, researchers have "found that patients with annual household
incomes below $50,000 were 27% less likely to participate in [cancer] clinical
trials."2 79 These researchers speculated that "incentives or reimbursements may
be appropriate" to promote fair access to cancer trials, but warned, mistakenly,
that such payments "should not be coercive to patients."280
In medicine, a false positive is an error where a result is improperly reported
as positive when it actually is not. A false negative is an error where a result is
improperly reported as negative when it actually is not.28 1 This is contrasted with
a true result: a true positive or a true negative. The judgments of an IRB can be
fallible just as medical tests can be fallible. We might equate disapproval of an
offer of payment that is actually ethically acceptable with a false negative.
Although our survey data do not allow us to determine conclusively how
frequently this occurs, the attitudes reflected in the survey suggest that under the
current scheme, there may be many false negatives.
Some false positives or false negatives may be unavoidable. One
consequence of changing the default to generally accept offers of payment is that
some offers of payment that are ethically concerning might get through-yet, we
expect that this is only a slight possibility. We have argued that coercion and
undue inducement are unlikely to occur in otherwise ethical clinical research.
276. See, e.g., Claudine G. Jennings et al., Does Offering an Incentive Payment Improve
Recruitment to Clinical Trials and Increase the Proportion of Socially Deprived Elderly
Participants?, 16 TRIALS 1 (2015) (finding a E100 incentive payment led to "small but significant
improvements" in the number of patients who consent to be screened for a clinical trial).
277. Caroline S. Bennette et al., Predicting Low Accrual in the National Cancer Institute's
Cooperative Group Clinical Trials, 108 J. NAT'LCANCER INST. 1 (2016).
278. Rebecca J. Williams et al., Terminated Trials in the ClinicalTrials.gov Results Database:
Evaluation of Availability of Primary Outcome Data and Reasons for Termination, 10 PLOS ONE
1(2015).
279. Unger et al., supra note 11, at 137-138.
280. Id. at 138.
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Given that the harms from overpayment are generally overstated, and the harms
from underpayment are understated or even ignored, we advocate changing the
default rules so that offers of payment will be deemed acceptable unless someone
can articulate a clear (i.e., precise) and persuasive-as opposed to speculative-
reason why it is not.
C. Policy Guidance and Rulemaking
Policy guidance and educational efforts are sorely needed to clarify the
concepts of coercion and undue inducement as applied to payment in the research
setting. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the U.S. regulations will be amended to
address this issue in the near future, but there are other avenues to improvement.
In November 2009, representatives from HHS and other departments
convened to draft the first substantive reforms to the Common Rule since it was
published in 1991; these representatives had the dual aims of enhancing research
participant protections and increasing the efficiency of the research oversight
process.282 Their meetings led to the release of an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) entitled "Human Subjects Research Protections:
Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and
Ambiguity for Investigators" in July 2011.283 The ANPRM did not substantively
address payment, coercion, or undue inducement.
In September 2015, the long awaited NPRM284 was published in the Federal
Register.28 5 Coming in at 131 Federal Register pages, the NPRM proposed a
number of significant changes to the Common Rule, as well as numerous minor
ones. 2 86 Again, however, payment was not substantively addressed.
Most recently, in January 2017, on the last day of President Obama's
administration, the final rule was published in the Federal Register, completing a
long and drawn out regulatory process, the outcome of which remains unclear in
light of its timing and the present political climate. Given the intense difficulty of
getting to this point, it is extremely unlikely that new rulemaking will be
forthcoming any time soon. The final rule modifies populations that are deemed
282. Emanuel, supra note 157, at 2297.
283. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and
Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512 (proposed July 26,
2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 & 45 C.F.R. §§ 46, 160, 164),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-26/pdf/2011-18792.pdf [https://perma.cc/9755-ACPT].
284. Leslie Meltzer Henry, Revising the Common Rule: Prospects and Challenges, 41 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 386, 387 (2013) (describing "pessimism" that progress toward issuing a NPRM was
"stalled, at least for the foreseeable future, if not permanently").
285. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933 (proposed Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-08/pdf/2015-21756.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3CM-
ZE4C].






Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol17/iss1/2
PAYING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
likely to be vulnerable to coercion and undue influence, dropping reference to
pregnant women and those with physical disabilities - but it does nothing to
clarify the definition of the terms or their precise role in evaluating offers of
payment.287
Unfortunately, this was likely a lost opportunity. If past experience is any
guide, the research community will be working with the rule finalized in 2017 for
some time (assuming it survives the political process and change in
administrations), meaning that additional formal rulemaking specifically
regarding payment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, we propose that OHRP update its FAQs and that the FDA update
its Information Sheet on payment to research participants, at least as a first step.
While this guidance would not be binding, as the embodiment of the agencies'
current thinking, it would likely be persuasive for many IRBs and investigators
and could help to address the present payment-conservative IRB culture. Indeed,
Jerry Menikoff, Director of OHRP, suggested at a recent public meeting that
OHRP is not particularly worried about payment resulting in undue inducement,
which he believes-as we do-to be rare. 288 This perspective indicates that
clarifying OHRP guidance on this topic would potentially be feasible, with the
salutary effect of rendering IRBs less worried about enforcement actions should
they approve higher payments.
Any such guidance should provide clear definitions of coercion and undue
inducement, as well as of exploitation-a concern that is not currently addressed
at all, but that we think is ethically salient, and increasingly so as more research
is conducted in developing countries. We would strongly advocate for our
preferred definitions. At a minimum, this guidance should clarify-by stating
explicitly rather than leaving it for the reader to infer-that genuine offers of
payment are never coercive and reflect the empirical evidence suggesting that
undue inducement is rare. It should also emphasize the importance of offering
reimbursement for research-related expenses and compensation for time, effort,
and inconvenience. Ideally, the guidance would also state that use of offers of
payment to incentivize research participation are generally acceptable and that
payment can be used to address exploitation, or an unfair distribution of research
benefits and burdens.
Additionally, we encourage efforts to reform international research
guidelines pertaining to payment. The recently revised 2016 CIOMS guidelines,
discussed above, are particularly welcome in this respect.289 While these
287. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 FED. REG. 7149, 7203-04 (Jan. 19,
2017)
288. Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections - May 2016 (Day 1), NAT'L
INsTs. HEALTH, (May 18, 2016), https://videocast.nih.gov/summary.asp?Live=19186&bhcp=l
[https://perma.cc/9G4V-ATHA].
289. See Emily A. Largent, Recently Proposed Changes to Legal and Ethical Guidelines
Governing Human Subjects Research, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 10 (2016).
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documents are of variable legal effect, they can be very influential in how people
think about the ethics of human subjects research.
CONCLUSION
The practice of offering payment to individuals in exchange for their
participation in clinical research is widespread and longstanding. Nevertheless,
offers of payment to research participants remain the source of substantial debate.
Two ethical charges routinely arise in relation to these offers-that they are
coercive or unduly influential. Because there is general agreement that coercion
and undue inducement are wrong in human subjects research, such a charge can
shut down conversation among IRB members and investigators, and result in
rejection of an offer of payment, or failure to make an offer in the first place.
As we have recounted, the various laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines
that govern the conduct of human subjects research offer relatively little in the
way of specific guidance about what factors or features characterize ethically
acceptable offers of payment. Additionally, there is a lack of agreement
regarding what exactly the terms coercion and undue inducement mean in the
human subjects research context. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the space
inhabited by IRB members and investigators is characterized by confusion and
conservatism. The results of our pilot survey suggest that IRB members and
investigators are worried about things that they probably do not need to be
worried about. That may lead to overprotection, and possibly distraction from
things they should actually be worried about-particularly the possibility that
offers of payment are too low. Ultimately, resolving misplaced concerns about
offers of payment being too high will offer investigators a more powerful
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Appendix 1. Comparing Policies of Harvard Catalyst-Affiliated
Research Institutions on Offers of Payment to Research Participants
Institution A
Policy Regarding Payment Yes
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation - "Remuneration may not be sizeable enough to induce subjects to
direct or indirect participate, regardless of how minimal the risk."
Definitions of Key Terms
Reimbursement













"The tIRBI will consider the protocol, including the time
commitment and the proposed procedures, when determining if
the planned amount is appropriate. . . . The (IRB] recognizes that
varying amounts and methods of remuneration may be
appropriate depending on the particular circumstances of a
protocol."
"There are no established policies as to the amount . .. of
payments that may be offered."
"The [IRB] does not have a set list of recommended
remuneration amounts for specific tests or length of visits, nor
does it require that one method (gift cards, cash, etc.) must be
used."
"Investigators may not require that a subject complete the
research in order to receive compensation. If a subject withdraws
from a study, he or she must be offered payment for the
completed portion of the study."
"'Completion bonuses' or additional payments above and beyond
reimbursements . . .are generally discouraged in pediatric
research however the [IRB] will consider whether an incentive
unduly influences a child and/or family to participate when
reviewing and approving this type of payment."
Should include when participant will receive remuneration, what
will be provided, and "other appropriate details"
"If participants will receive compensation/reimbursements, it can
be noted (e.g. reimbursement for parking and/or your time will be
provided). However, do not overly stress the compensation. In
general, the [IRB] does not allow dollar values to be specified."
"It is sometimes desirable to provide payments to subjects and
their families for their participation in research projects."
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Institution B
Policy Regarding Paynent Yes
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation -
direct or indirect
Definitions of Key Terms




"The goal of IRB oversight of research subject compensation is
to ensure that stipends paid to research subjects provide fair
compensation without undue pressure (coercion) to participate.
Excessive monetary compensation may cause subjects to
undertake risks or discomforts that they otherwise would not
assume. This unfairly targets subjects of lower socioeconomic
groups and places more of the 'risk burden' of medical research
on these groups. In the case of healthy volunteer studies, the IRB
is often in the position of suggesting decreased compensation
over that suggested by investigators, in an effort to decrease the




"[A] list of approximate monetary compensations for a variety of
frequently performed clinical activities is listed below. This list
is meant to guide investigators, and is based upon active
protocols currently approved by the [IRB]. Although not every
procedure is listed, these amounts may guide investigators by
allowing comparison of new procedures in terms of time and
discomfort."
"It is a general policy that compensation for participation in
research projects is pro-rated according to the amount of time






"In many protocols where completion of all visits or procedures
is paramount, there is some element of 'incentive' provided by
withholding some compensation until the end of the study, or
providing a 'bonus' for completion of all segments of the study.
Such procedures should be explained and rationalized in detail in
the research protocol, and clearly outlined in the informed
consent documents."
Should include information on completion bonuses.
"All advertisements should be tastefully composed and not
inappropriately emphasize monetary remuneration."
"Specify the amount of monetary compensation (if you wish)."
"Don't: Feature monetary compensation as a lead in before the
description of study purpose and procedures; bold, italicize,
underline or enlarge fonts on type describing monetary
compensation."
"It is not necessary, required, or desirable that all subjects










"The [IRB] shall determine that Human Subjects are not subject to coercion or undue influence to
participate in the Research. Factors such as, but not limited to, ... payment for participation, and
unfair inducements should be taken into consideration."
"The [IRB] is required to review payments to subjects to determine that: (1) The amount of
payment and the proposed method and timing of disbursement is neither coercive [n]or presents
undue influence. . .. (3) Any amount paid as a bonus for completion is reasonable and not so large
as to unduly induce subjects to stay in the study when they would otherwise have withdrawn."
"The (IRB) is required to review payments to subjects to determine that .. [cjredit for payment
accrued as the study progresses is not contingent upon the subject completing the entire study."
"The [IRB] is required to review payments to subjects to determine that ... [a]ny amount paid as a
bonus for completion is reasonable and not so large as to unduly induce subjects to stay in the
study when they would otherwise have withdrawn."
"Investigafor should seek consent under circumstances that minimize coercion or undue influence"
"Advertisements may state that Human Subjects will be paid, but should not emphasize the
payment or the amount to be paid, by such means as larger or bold type."
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Institution D
Poliy Regarding Payment Yes
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation -
direct or indirect
Definitions of KeyTerms






"The . . . IRB must determine that the following requirements
are satisfied before it approves research: . . . There are
appropriate additional safeguards included in the study to protect
the rights and welfare of participants who are likely to be
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence."
fIformed Consent
"Advertisements may state that subjects will be paid, but should
not emphasize the payment or the amount of be paid, by such
means as larger or bold type and compensation information
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Institution E Institution F
Yes
"The IRB reviews remuneration plans to assess
whether the amount, schedule and type of any
proposed compensation is fair for the
"The IRB shall review both the amount of participant, and to assess whether the payments
payment and the proposed method and timing of could be considered coercive (i.e., by unduly
disbursement to determine that neither are inducing individuals to participate because
coercive nor present undue influence." compensation would difficult to refuse."
Remuneration
"Payment to research subjects for participation
in studies is considered compensation for time
and inconvenience rather than a benefit to
subjects."
"Payment(s) shall be made to the subject as the
study progresses and shall not be contingent
upon the subject completing the entire study. If,
for example, payment is made for each
appointment attended, the payment must be
made after each appointment."
Compensation
"In general, remuneration. should be
comparable to other projects involving similar
time, effort, and inconvenience."
"In general, remuneration . .. [s]hould be pro-
rated based on the number of procedures and
study visits and should not be conditioned on
completing the entire study, although a bonusfor
completing the study may be acceptable."
"Any amount paid as a bonus for completion
must be reasonable and not so large as to unduly
induce participants to stay in the study who
otherwise would have withdrawn."
"[A] timetable for the payments themselves must
be . . presented to every subject as part of the
Informed Consent process."
"The Informed Consent Form must clearly
establish how the subject is to be paid, i.e. cash,
check, etc. A subject must sign a receipt for any
cash payment, and this procedure must also be
described as part of the Informed Consent
process."
"Advertising materials shall not include the
following: . . . an emphasis on the payment or
the amount to be paid, by such means as larger
or bold type. The IRB has authority to approve
whether compensation shall be included in the
advertisement."
"Tn general, remuneration .. . [s]pecifics
(including the amount per visit and payment
schedule) should be documented in the consent
form under the 'Compensation' section--but not
under the 'Benefits section."'
"Recruitment materials should not emphasize
remuneration for participation (e.g., larger or
bold type)."
"Remuneration.. . ordinarily offered as a form
of appreciation for the individual's time and
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Institution G
Poliy Regarding Payment
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation -
direct or indirect
Definitions of Key Terms







"The [IRBI is required to review payments to subjects to
determine that: ... The amount of payment and the proposed
method and timing of disbursement is neither coercive or
presents undue influence."
See also 'Completion Bonuses'
"The [IRB] is required to review payments to subjects to
determine that: ... Credit for payment accrued as the study
progresses is not contigent upon the subject completing the
entire study."
"The [IRB] is required to review payments to subjects to
determine that: .. . Any amount paid as a bonus for completion
is reasonable and not so large as to unduly induce subjects to













"Under Federal regulations, the [IRB] must
review and approve methods used to recruit
subjects to ensure that the methods are not
coercive."
Yes
"PIs are responsible to: ... Ensure the informed
consent process is free from coercion or undue
influence."
"NOTE: Payment cannot be held until the end of
the study as that is potentially coercive."
Reimbursement
Compensation
"Indicate how much subjects will receive for
each portion of the study completed and the
payment form (e.g., cash, check, gift card).
Specify the payment schedule, including a.
prorated plan should a subject withdraw or be
withdrawn from a study prior to his/her
completion."
"The IRB, when appropriate, will . . . consider
whether the following additional elements of
informed consent are required and whether they
are adequately included in the [informed consent
document]: ... An explanation of the payment
plan or a statement that subjects will not be paid
for participation,"
"Advertisements may state that subjects will be
paid, but should not emphasize the payment or
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Institution J
Policy Regarding Payment Yes
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation -
direct or indirect




In the consent process section, "Describe any steps that will be







"Both the informed consent discussion and the writtei
consent form and any other written information to be
participants should include explanations of the follow
anticipated prorated payment, if any, to the participan
participating in the trial."
"Include the following information. . .Money or othe
compensation or reimbursement, e.g., gif0 certificate,
voucher, parking voucher, and travel expenses. Inclu(
method and timing of the compensation.... Include I
amount of compensation is calculated if the participat
complete the entire study for any reason."
"If participants will not be paid or will not receive otf













"When subjects are being paid, the [IRB] will review both the amount of payment and the
proposed method and timing of disbursement to assure that neither is coercive."
"The [IRB] must review both the amount of payment and the proposed method of disbursement to
ensure that neither entails problems of coercion or undue influence."
"The [IRB] pays particular attention to remuneration and other inducements that might encourage
people with limited resources to participate in research projects in which they might not otherwise
participate. Compensation should not be the sole grounds for participation in a research project,
and should not cause participants to assume risks that they would not ordinarily find acceptable.
The [IRB] considers persons with limited resources to be vulnerable to the extent that inducements
to participate in research may result in their acting against their own best interests. Where the
population from which subjects will be recruited primarily consists of people with limited
resources,. . . [t]he investigator will be asked to justify the compensation being offered. If the
[IRBI finds it to be coercive, then the [IRB] will ask the investigator to provide alternative




"In general payments should be proportional to the degree of risk, inconvenience, or discomfort
associated with participation."
"The consent form must describe the terms of payment and the conditions under which subjects
would receive partial payment or no payment (e.g., if they withdraw from the study before their
participation is completed)."
"The [IRBI will review advertisements to ensure that they do not ... unduly emphasize the
amount subjects receive in compensation."
"Payment to research subjects may be an incentive for participation or a way to reimburse a
subject for travel and other expenses incurred due to participation. However, payment for
participation is not considered a research benefit. Regardless of the form of remuneration,
investigators must take care to avoid coercion of subjects. In general payments should be
proportional to the degree of risk, inconvenience, or discomfort associated with participation."
139
79
Largent and Fernandez Lynch: Paying Research Participants: Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Institution L
iPolicy RegardingfPayment--
Discussion of Coercion, Undue
Influence, or Exploitation -
direct or indirect
Definitions of Key Terms







"Subjects may receive reasonable payment for the time and
trouble associated with participating in a study. Payment should
not be coercive."
"All subjects should be paid the same."
"If a subject withdraws before the conclusionof the experiment,
payment must be pro-rated."
"Incentive or bonus payments may ... be appropriate under
certain circumstances to encourage completion of experiments.
Such payments may not be given for assuming increased risk."
"The informed consent document should mention the possibility
of tax withholding, when appropriate."
"If some groups are either not paid or paid differently from other













"Subjects must give consent without coercion or undue influence and the prospective subject or
legally authorized representative must be provided with sufficient opportunity whether or not to
participate in the research."
"If completion of research is not a condition of compensation, you must describe how
compensation will be prorated and calculated for subjects who withdraw early."
"All information concerning payment to subjects, including the amount, type (cash, check, or in
kind) and schedule of payments, must be included in the consent form,"
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